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methods could help clarify five questions: (i) what morphology and syntax, if any,
do monkey calls have? (ii) what is the ‘lexical meaning’ of individual calls? (iii)
how are the meanings of individual calls combined? (iv) how do calls or call
sequences compete with each other when several are appropriate in a given
situation? (v) how did the form and meaning of calls evolve? We address these
questions in five case studies pertaining to cercopithecines (Putty-nosed monkeys,
Blue monkeys, and Campbell’s monkeys), colobinae (Guereza monkeys and King
Colobus monkeys), and New World monkeys (Titi monkeys). The morphology
mostly involves simple calls, but in at least one case (Campbell’s -oo) we find a
root-suffix structure, possibly with a compositional semantics. The syntax is in all
clear cases simple and finite-state. With respect to meaning, nearly all cases of call
concatenation can be analyzed as conjunction. But a key question concerns the
division of labor between semantics, pragmatics and the environmental context
(‘world’ knowledge and context change). An apparent case of dialectal variation
in the semantics (Campbell’s krak) can arguably be analyzed away if one posits
sufficiently powerful mechanisms of competition among calls, akin to scalar
implicatures. An apparent case of non-compositionality (Putty-nosed pyow-hack
sequences) can be analyzed away if one further posits a pragmatic principle of
‘urgency’, whereby threat-related calls must come early in sequences (another
potential case of non-compositionality – Colobus snort-roar sequences – might
justify assigning non-compositional meanings to complex calls, but results are
tentative). Finally, rich Titi sequences in which two calls are re-arranged in com-
plex ways so as to reflect information about both predator identity and location are
argued not to involve a complex syntax/semantics interface, but rather a fine-
grained interaction between simple call meanings and the environmental context.
With respect to call evolution, we suggest that the remarkable preservation of call
form and function over millions of years should make it possible to lay the
groundwork for an evolutionary monkey linguistics, which we illustrate with cerco-
pithecine booms, and with a comparative analysis of Blue monkey and Putty-nosed
monkey repertoires. Throughout, we aim to compare possible theories rather than
to fully adjudicate between them, and our claims are correspondingly modest. But
we hope that our methods could lay the groundwork for a formal monkey linguistics
combining data from primatology with formal techniques from linguistics (from
which it does not follow that the calls under study share non-trivial properties, let
alone an evolutionary history, with human language).
Keywords: primate linguistics, primate semantics, primate syntax, evolutionary
primate linguistics, call evolution, evolution of language
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1 Introduction
We argue that rich data gathered in experimental primatology in the last 40
years can benefit from the type of analytical methods used in contemporary
linguistics. Focusing on the syntactic and especially semantic side, we argue
that these methods could help clarify five questions: (i) what morphology and
syntax, if any, do monkey calls have? (ii) what is the ‘lexical meaning’ of
individual calls? (iii) how are the meanings of individual calls combined?
(iv) how do calls or call sequences compete with each other when several are
appropriate in a given situation? (v) how did the form and meaning of calls
evolve?
We address these questions in five case studies pertaining to cercopithe-
cines (Putty-nosed monkeys, Blue monkeys, and Campbell’s monkeys), colobi-
nae (Guereza monkeys and King Colobus monkeys), and New World monkeys
(Titi monkeys). As we will see, the morphology mostly involves simple calls, but
in at least one case (Campbell’s -oo) we find a root-suffix structure, possibly with
a compositional semantics. The syntax is in all clear cases simple and finite-
state, and our findings will be extremely modest in this area (see Kershenbaum
et al. 2014a, 2014b for a far more ambitious program in animal syntax). With
respect to meaning, nearly all cases of call concatenation can be analyzed
without positing any non-trivial semantic operation – each call can be analyzed
as a separate utterance. But a key question concerns the division of labor among
semantics, pragmatics and properties of the environment (‘world knowledge’ and
context change). An apparent case of dialectal variation in the semantics
(Campbell’s krak) can arguably be analyzed away if one posits sufficiently
powerful mechanisms of competition among calls, akin to scalar implicatures.
An apparent case of non-compositionality (Putty-nosed pyow-hack sequences)
can be analyzed away if one further posits a pragmatic principle of ‘urgency’,
whereby threat-related calls must come early in sequences. On the other hand,
another potential case of non-compositionality (Colobus snort-roar sequences)
might justify assigning non-compositional meanings to complex calls, but
results are rather tentative. Finally, rich Titi monkey sequences in which two
calls are re-arranged in complex ways so as to reflect information about both
predator identity and location are argued not to involve a complex syntax/
semantics interface, but rather a fine-grained interaction between simple call
meanings and a complex ecology. With respect to call evolution, we suggest that
the remarkable preservation of call form and function over millions of years
should make it possible to lay the groundwork for an evolutionary monkey
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linguistics, which we illustrate with cercopithecine booms, and with a compara-
tive analysis of Blue monkey and Putty-nosed monkey repertoires.
Throughout, we aim to compare possible theories rather than to fully
adjudicate between them, and our claims are correspondingly modest. But we
hope to convince the reader that the simple methods we apply to monkey calls
make it possible to study them in greater detail than has been the case here-
tofore, and lead to new research questions as well as new predictions that might
help decide among competing theories. We thus believe that these methods
should lay the groundwork for a formal monkey linguistics combining data
from primatology with formal methods from linguistics. We emphasize that
our general methodological claims do not entail that the calls under study
share non-trivial properties, let alone an evolutionary history, with human
language; on the other hand, we think the precise approach we advocate is a
precondition to a meaningful comparison.
In what follows, we freely apply linguistic terminology to monkey calls,
with the belief – motivated below – that they can and should be studied as
formal languages with a sound system, a lexicon, a morphology, a syntax, a
semantics, and a pragmatics. Descriptively, whenever possible we use the term
sentence to refer to a sequence of calls preceded and followed by a longer-than-
normal pause; we use the term discourse to refer to the series of sentences
triggered by an external event (for instance an eagle shriek or a leopard growl).1
While we could say that a sentence is ‘adequate’ or ‘inadequate’ in a certain
situation, we prefer to employ traditional logical terminology and use the terms
‘true’ and ‘false’, which are more familiar to linguists. These terminological
moves are just intended to facilitate the discussion; crucially, they should not
be taken to imply that the formal properties of monkey languages are similar to
those of human language – in the cases we study below, for the most part they
just aren’t.
1.1 Monkey calls
Observations and field experiments in primatology have yielded detailed infor-
mation about vocal communication in primates in general and monkeys in
particular (see for instance Zuberbühler 2003, 2009 for surveys). These pertain
to the inventory, use, structure, and sometimes phylogeny and ontogeny of
1 In human language, a further distinction is needed between sentences and clauses that might
appear within sentences. This distinction won’t be needed here.
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various calls, in particular alert calls2 – with rare cases of apparent dialectal
variation (Schlenker et al. 2014). Naturalistic observations make it possible to
establish statistical correlations between (i) properties of the situations, such as
the presence of predators or encounters between monkey groups, and (ii) calls
used in those situations. Field experiments have typically been of two types. In
trigger-to-call experiments, the presence of a disturbance is simulated, for
instance by way of playback of leopard growls or eagle shrieks, or through the
presence of a model leopard or eagle; in call-to-behavior experiments, alert calls
are played back and the monkeys’ responses are assessed. Note that since calls
may be viewed as ‘triggers’ or as ‘behaviors’, these two categories are not
mutually exclusive; as a result, there is some overlap between the categories
in (1)b and (1)c below.
(1) Types of generalizations
a. Naturalistic observations: correlations between (i) properties of the
situation, and (ii) calls used in that situation.
b. Trigger-to-call experiments: causal generalizations of the form: if (i) the
situation has property P, then (ii) sequences S1, …, Sn of calls may/must
be used.
c. Call-to-behavior experiments: causal generalizations of the form: if (i) a
sequence S of calls is used, then (ii) the target subjects behave as if the
situation had property P.
For each of the species studied here, we will show that the patterns resulting
from these studies show non-trivial properties from a morphological, syntactic,
semantic, or pragmatic point of view. Let us briefly highlight some of these
findings here.
The calls of male Campbell’s monkeys display patterns that pertain to
lexical semantics, morphological composition, and pragmatic competition.
Male Campbell’s monkeys were argued in Ouattara et al. (2009a, 2009b) to
have at least three roots3 (= boom, krak, hok) and one suffix (= -oo) that can
be appended to both krak and hok.4 The choice of call, and the optional
2 We try to use the term ‘alert call’ with a broader meaning than ‘alarm call’: the latter only
pertains to dangers, whereas the former can also be used for other noteworthy events.
3 A potential fourth call, wak, was argued by Keenan et al. (2013) to just be a variant of hok, on
the basis of acoustic and clustering analyses. More precisely, they argued that if one wishes to
treat wak as being different from hok, then one should also subdivide krak into distinct
categories.
4 On the basis of an acoustic analysis, Kuhn et al. (2014) confirmed that the phonetic realiza-
tion of -oo is indeed consistent with the suffixal hypothesis.
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suffixation of -oo, were shown to have systematic effects on the contexts in
which the calls can be used: the authors argued that krak primarily has leopard-
related uses, that hok primarily has eagle-related uses, and that krak-oo is used
as a general alert call. Further refinements were offered in later work. Adding to
the picture, Schlenker et al. (2014) discussed comparative data (due to Arnold
and Keenan) suggesting that there is apparent dialectal variation between the
Tai forest and Tiwai island: although krak has a primarily leopard-related mean-
ing in Tai (where leopards exist), the same call is used as a general alert call on
Tiwai, where leopards have been absent for decades. Schlenker et al. (2014)
developed several possible analyses, one of which posited that krak was a
general alert call on both sites, hok was related to non-terrestrial disturbances,
boom involved non-predation situations, and -oo had a (compositional) attenua-
tive function. The apparent dialectal variation was handled in this theory by
positing that rules of competition among calls give rise to an optional enrich-
ment of krak into something akin to krak and not hok and not krakoo; the
resulting meaning was that of a ‘serious terrestrial disturbance’, which could
single out leopards in Tai but would be essentially useless on Tiwai.
On the syntactic side, we will focus on a collection of interesting distribu-
tional patterns in the call sequences of Putty-nosed monkeys, Black-and-White
Colobus monkeys, and Titi monkeys. In general, the syntax of primate call
sequences is not well understood; for Campbell’s monkeys, for example, cate-
gorical distributional generalizations are hard to come by.5 This is in sharp
contrast with the syntactic generalizations that have been offered in the litera-
ture on birdsongs: these have led to sophisticated analyses that make it possible
to ask where birdsongs are in the Chomsky hierarchy of formal languages (Berwick
et al. 2011). The primate literature hasn’t reached anything like this level yet.
Nevertheless, the cases discussed below show non-trivial syntactic patterns,
where calls are structurally combined in some way, with a potentially composi-
tional semantics. Combinations may in principle be of two kinds: phonological,
in which case it makes no sense to seek a compositional meaning (since the
parts combined – e. g. /n/ + /o/ in no – may have no meaning in the first place);
or morphological/syntactic – in which case rules of semantic composition may
be sought.
In a series of articles, Arnold and Zuberbühler have investigated how Putty-
nosed monkeys combine two calls, pyow ( =P) and hack ( =H; see Arnold and
5 The one exception is the boom call, which Zuberbühler (2002) argues obeys a syntactic rule
according to which it may only occur at the very beginning of sequences. It might be that the
articulatory properties of boom are responsible for this fact (it is produced with filled air sacs
and might require considerable energy, and hence a resting phase).
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Zuberbühler 2012). Pyows function as general alert calls, whereas hacks are
usually related to aerial predators. On the syntactic side, these two calls may
be combined in several ways, but it’s not the case that anything goes: for
example, alternating sequences of single pyows and single hacks (e. g.
PHPHPHPHPH) are not found. Similarly, one finds sequences made of a few
pyows followed by a few hacks (e. g. PPPHHH), called ‘pyow-hack sequences’;
but the opposite pattern – a few hacks immediately followed by a few pyows –
isn’t common. Descriptively, these are relatively clear syntactic patterns – what-
ever their source may be. On the semantic side, pyow-hack sequences were
shown in field experiments to trigger group movement. This immediately raises
a non-trivial question: is the meaning of pyow-hack sequences somehow derived
from the meaning of their parts? Arnold and Zuberbühler (2012) give a negative
answer, but it is clear that one’s theoretical assumptions about the lexical
meaning of the calls and the rules of combination might radically change the
picture – which is precisely what we will argue below.
Black-and-White Colobus monkey calls studied by Schel et al. (2009) also
display interesting patterns, with three kinds of sequences: individual snorts
(henceforth s), roaring sequences, made of a series of roars (henceforth r+), and
snort-roar sequences, made of a single snort immediately followed by a roaring
sequence (henceforth sr+). Here too, the syntax is apparently constrained.
Descriptively, snorts are never repeated without pause; if they appear in a
sentence, it is always at the beginning; and snort-roar sentences are quite rare
at the very beginning of discourses. There are also interesting semantic general-
izations to be obtained. While snorts and roars occur in every context, snorts
given singly only occur in ground predator (including chimpanzee) contexts;
and while repetitions of roars occur in every context (though they are less
common in leopard-related situations), when they occur at the beginning of
discourses they are indicative of eagles. An obvious challenge is to account for
these fine-grained semantic generalizations: is it possible to give a unified
meaning to snorts on the one hand, and to roars on the other, or should we
posit that in some cases the smallest units that convey information are
sequences of several calls (so that the elementary calls play the role of pho-
nemes)? While the patterns are very different from those we sketched for Putty-
nosed monkeys, the foundational issues they raise are of the same nature. As we
will see below, clear syntactic and semantic patterns also emerge in the Titi
monkeys of South America, which have led to fascinating generalizations in
recent work by Cäsar et al. (2012a, 2012b, 2013) – a point to which we return
below.
While these data pertain to the form and meaning of monkey calls, their
ontogeny (development from infanthood to adulthood) and phylogeny
Formal monkey linguistics 7
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(evolutionary development) can be studied as well. In their pioneering study of
monkey alert calls, Seyfarth and Cheney (1980) showed by way of field experi-
ments that vervet monkeys use three alarm calls that carry information about the
presence of eagles, snakes and leopards respectively. But they also investigated
the development of these calls from infants to adults, and showed that
“as infants grow older they sharpen the association between predator species
and the type of alarm call”. For instance, the ‘eagle’ call is initially triggered by
all sorts of birds, and gradually acquires a much narrower use related to
dangerous eagles. These findings can presumably be interpreted in at least
two ways: it might be that the meaning of the calls is initially broad and
becomes narrower over time; alternatively, it might be that the meaning remains
fixed and is broad (‘bird call’), but that the monkeys gradually learn that only
predators are worth calling attention to.
The phylogeny of calls was traditionally studied indirectly. When DNA data
were less prevalent and complete than they are today, some prominent prima-
tologists used phonetic similarities among the calls of different species to help
reconstruct their phylogenetic trees (see for instance Gautier 1988) – a metho-
dology that has fallen out of favor in more recent years. But it is striking that
the form and sometimes the function of some calls is remarkably well pre-
served over millions of years. To give but two examples: booms are found in
various points of the phylogenetic tree of cercopithecines. This is compatible
with the view (among others) that they were present in the most recent
common ancestor of all cercopithecines, who according to the DNA study of
Guschanski et al. (2013) lived more than 10 million years ago (see the detailed
tree at http://sysbio.oxfordjournals.org/content/62/4/539/F1.expansion.html);
we will remain agnostic below concerning such ancient periods, but we will
make claims about what happened 2–3 million years ago.6 Furthermore, as far
as we know booms generally have to do with non-predation situations, hence
part of their function might go way back as well. More recently, Putty-nosed
and Blue monkeys separated approximately 2.5 million years ago (Guschanski
et al. 2013), but they have very similar pyows and hacks. The prospect of an
evolutionary linguistics of monkey calls is tantalizing, and we will come back
to it below.
6 Importantly, different DNA methods may lead to different results – e. g. divergence dates may
differ between Guschanski et al. (2013), based on mitochondrial DNA, and Perelman (2011),
based on nuclear DNA. When details matter (as in the evolutionary considerations of Section 7),
such differences should be revisited in future research.
8 Philippe Schlenker et al.
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1.2 Initial questions
While the data are rich, their interpretation – especially with respect to their
cognitive status – has been a matter of debate.
First, should the calls really be analyzed as communicative/‘linguistic’
signals? While monkeys usually react appropriately to the calls of conspecifics
in call-to-behavior experiments ((1)c above), alert calls also seem to have a role
in deterring predators, for instance by letting them know that they have been
detected (e. g. Caro 2005; Zuberbühler 2009). Furthermore, the fact that monkeys
extract information from the calls of conspecifics doesn’t necessarily place these
in a different category from other regularities of nature. Hornbills (a brightly
colored bird) were shown in field experiments to react appropriately to some
calls of Diana monkeys: they discriminated between eagle Diana calls, which
were indicative of a direct threat for them, and leopard calls, which were not
(Rainey et al. 2004a, 2004b; Zuberbühler 2009). This certainly indicates that
hornbills associate Diana calls to the presence of predators, but maybe they
do so by the same mechanisms that allow them to associate eagle shrieks to the
presence of eagles – there might be nothing specifically ‘linguistic’ about this
inference. In this piece, we will take the view that calls have conditions of use
that must be described and modeled irrespective of the mechanisms involved; it
is by studying the generalizations and possible theories that one might come to
the conclusion that these calls involve more or less specific abilities.
Second, is the production of calls in any way voluntary and/or attuned to
the audience? Chimpanzee alarm calls were shown to be triggered differentially
depending on the belief state of the audience; in an experiment discussed in
Crockford et al. 2012, “chimpanzees were more likely to alarm call in response to
a snake in the presence of unaware group members than in the presence of
aware group members”. This rules out a low-level mechanism whereby the
presence of a threat automatically triggers the production of the call. But we
know of no such results in the monkeys under study here, which leaves open the
possibility that call production is a fairly automatic process. In the present piece,
we will take the position that call use gives rise to interesting semantic problems
irrespective of whether call production is voluntary.
Third, should one analyze the proximate mechanisms by which calls are
triggered (or understood), or should one study their evolutionary function? As
pointed out in Fuller 2013, the two notions might in principle diverge. To give an
example we will revisit below, the hacks of Putty-nosed monkeys might be
triggered by situations of high arousal, as Arnold has emphasized (e. g. Arnold
and Zuberbühler 2013). But it might be because these are strongly correlated
with the presence of eagles that the call was selected: the evolutionary function
Formal monkey linguistics 9
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might be that of an eagle call, even if the proximate mechanism and some of the
uses are not eagle-related. Similarly, it could be that a call was selected because
it had a variety of positive effects on conspecifics, and that for this reason
searching for the function of the call is misguided. Here, we will take the
position that a good understanding of the proximate mechanisms by which
calls are produced and interpreted will help address more ambitious questions
about call function in the future.
Fourth, when calls communicate information to conspecifics, what is their
semantic content? One important distinction is whether calls directly encode
information about a predator type, or about properties of the threat (level,
directional origin, etc), or a combination of both. In the first case (information
about predator types), ethologists often say that the calls are ‘functionally
referential’. As will be seen below, whether calls make reference to types of
objects or to arousal levels they might give rise to is sometimes hard to answer;
for instance, if Putty-nosed hacks are triggered by high arousal, and it turns out
that the latter is mostly or exclusively associated with the presence of eagles,
should we say that hacks are functionally referential? These fine-grained dis-
tinctions are sometimes empirically important, but they are hard to draw.
Fortunately, in several cases the structure of the informativity relations among
calls matters more than their fine-grained lexical content, and for this reason
some of our analyses will not require that we take a stand on such issues. More
generally, in most cases the general form of our theories will not be dependent
on the distinction between ‘referential’ and ‘non-referential’ meanings for calls
in the primatologist’s sense, and we will correspondingly de-emphasize this
question.
1.3 The phylogenetic landscape
In the present study, we will be primarily concerned with Old World and
New World monkeys. As illustrated in (2), in some estimates the most recent
common ancestor of Old World monkeys and apes (and humans) lived more
than 30 million years ago. The most recent common ancestor of New World
monkeys and apes (or for that matter New World monkeys or humans) lived
more than 40 million years ago. These distances alone explain why we are
currently agnostic about the relation between these monkey languages and
human language. (Furthermore, when similarities are found among systems
that are that distant, they may well be due to convergent evolution rather than
common descent.) Of the species discussed in this paper, Putty-nosed monkeys,
Blue monkeys and Campbell’s monkeys are all part of a subfamily of Old World
10 Philippe Schlenker et al.
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monkeys called ‘cercopithecines’ (technically, ‘cercopithecini’, included in (2)
under the larger family of ‘cercopithecinae’7). Putty-nosed monkeys and Blue
monkeys have a most recent common ancestor that lived approximately 2.5
million years ago. In turn, their most recent common ancestor with Campbell’s
monkeys lived approximately 7.5 million years ago (Guschanski et al. 2013). We
will also be concerned with Black-and-White Colobus monkeys, which are part
of another family of Old World monkeys, called ‘colobinae’. Colobus monkeys
and cercopithecines probably have a most recent common ancestor that lived –
very approximately – 18 million years ago (Perelman et al. 2011). Finally, we will
be interested in the calls of Titi monkeys living in South America; since they are
New World monkeys, their most recent common ancestor with cercopithecines
and Colobus monkeys lived more than 40 million years ago. We will remind the
reader of these phylogenetic facts when the relative proximity or distance among
the species is relevant.
(2) Primate phylogeny
The next section describes our formal approach, and later sections illustrate it
on several case studies.
Source: Perelman et al. 2011. Figure drawn with Lucie Ravaux’s help.
7 Cercopithecinae include cercopithecini and papionini (the latter include macaques and
baboons, among others).
Formal monkey linguistics 11
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2 The formal approach
2.1 Formal properties and cognitive implementation
2.1.1 A two-step approach
We believe that the questions introduced in Section 1.2 are both important and
difficult, but that much can be gained by adopting a two-step approach: one
should start by setting up explicit theories of the form and truth conditions of
monkey sequences; one should then ask how the relevant rules are cognitively
implemented.
(3) A two-step approach
a. A detailed formal theory should be developed to predict in detail
i) the form of monkey sequences, i.e. which sequences are permissible
in monkey productions (in linguistic parlance, this requires a phono-
logical, morphological and/or syntactic analysis);
ii) the meaning of monkey sequences, understood as the conditions
under which sequences of alert calls are applicable or ‘true’. The
theory should in particular be constrained by naturalistic observa-
tions, trigger-to-call and call-to-behavior experiments ((1) above).
b. The cognitive implementation of rules coming out of (a) should be
evaluated based on a combination of behavioral and/or neurological
data (when available), and theory-internal considerations (e.g. the
potential decision to establish a division of labor between ‘literal mean-
ing’ and ‘pragmatics’).
To be clear, we believe that the ultimate goal is to have a detailed theory of what
goes on in the monkeys’ minds when they produce or perceive calls. But we
think that this goal will be better achieved once we have a detailed theory of the
form and use of monkey calls. In fact, we believe that there are two relevant
lessons to be gained from the history of formal linguistics. One is that much
empirical and conceptual precision can be gained by treating natural commu-
nicative systems as interpreted formal languages. The second is that once a formal
approach is in place, it can naturally be integrated into a cognitive framework in
which precise questions can be asked about the division of labor among different
modules.
A perennial question in the literature on animal communication is whether
the communicative system of species X can ‘really’ be called a ‘language’. But
12 Philippe Schlenker et al.
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from the perspective of contemporary linguistics, human language itself is
treated as a formal language of a particular kind. And it takes extraordinarily
little for something to count as a formal language. An example is given in (4),
where we treat the expressions 0 (‘zero’), s0 (‘the successor of zero’), ss0 (‘the
successor of the successor of zero’), etc. as a set of well-formed strings defined
from a very simple lexicon with two atomic expressions, 0 and s. We can also
endow this set of well-formed expressions with a compositional semantics,
whereby 0 denotes the number zero, and for any well-formed expression sE
denotes the number that follows what E denotes.
(4) An example from arithmetic: {0, s0, ss0, sss0, …}
a. Lexicon: {0, s}
b. Syntax: 0 is an expression; if E is an expression, so is sE.
c. Semantics: 0 denotes zero;
For all E, sE denotes the successor of what E denotes.
Should we call the set of strings 0, s0, ss0, … a language? It depends on what we
mean by ‘language’. If a ‘language’ is just a set of well-formed expressions, the
answer is positive. If a ‘language’ is a set of well-formed expressions with a
semantics, it is only with the addition of (4)c that the set qualifies. There are all
sorts of other reasonable terminological choices: we could require that a ‘lan-
guage’ have certain designated syntactic or semantic properties; or that it should
have live users and possibly a pragmatics, etc. Turning to natural systems, the
question ‘Does species X have language?’ is of no particular interest unless one
has said what one means by ‘language’. With the minimal definition of formal
language theory, one will be able to give a trivially positive answer in countless
cases – which only highlights the fact that with this definition the (trivial)
question ‘Does species X have language?’ should be replaced with the (hard)
question ‘What are the formal properties of the language of species X’. This is
the approach we will take in this piece.
2.1.2 Lessons from formal linguistics
But isn’t such an approach overly formal? We would argue that even in the case
of human language, where the existence of sophisticated cognitive abilities is
uncontroversial, a precise characterization of the formal properties of a language
is a good first step towards an analysis of its cognitive implementation. In
syntax, various approaches broadly inspired by Chomsky’s work (e. g. 1957,
1965) developed a formal and a cognitive approach in tandem. In semantics,
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the model-theoretic tradition pioneered by Montague started out with an analy-
sis of English as a purely formal language, with minimal commitments about its
cognitive status (e. g. Montague 1970a, 1970b); later generations asked further
questions about the cognitive reality and implementation of semantic knowl-
edge – and fully built on results of the formal approach (e. g. Bott et al. 2011;
Chemla et al. 2014a, 2014b).
The way in which formal models may yield insight into cognitive represen-
tations can be illustrated with the simple example of the meaning of the word or
in English. One will quickly realize that in some cases or appears to be exclusive
(S or S’ is true just in case exactly one of S, S’ is true), as in (5)a; while in others
its meaning appears to be inclusive (S or S’ is true just in case at least one of S, S’
is true), as in (5)b.
(5) a. I will invite Ann or Mary.
⇒ usually gives rise to the inference that I will invite Ann or Mary but not
both.
b. I doubt that I’ll invite Ann or Mary.
⇒ usually equivalent to: I doubt that I’ll invite Ann or Mary or both
(hence in particular it’s unlikely that I’ll invite both Ann and Mary).
But a deeper generalization can be stated: the sentence in (5)b, where the inclusive
reading is dominant, is also one in which or appears in a ‘negative environment’,
in a sense to be made precise. An elegant theory can be devised, in the spirit of
Grice (1975): the meaning of or is inclusive, but a sentence with or automatically
evokes (or ‘competes with’) the corresponding sentence with and. As a result, if
one has reason to think that the speaker is maximally informative, one can infer
the negation of the sentence with and in case the latter is strictly more informative
than the sentence with or. The resulting mini-theory is stated in (6).
(6) a. Partial syntax: If S and S’ are well-formed clauses, so is [S or S’].
b. Partial semantics: [S or S’] is true if and only if S is true or S’ is true or
both are.
c. Partial pragmatics: Suppose a speaker uttered a sentence of the form
[… S or S’ …]. If [… S and S’ …] is strictly more
informative than [… S or S’ …] and if the speaker
was maximally informative, he was not in a posi-
tion to assert [… S and S’ …].
While it has been considerably refined in recent years, this mini-theory has the
virtue of explaining why exclusive readings are dominant in (5)a while the
14 Philippe Schlenker et al.
 - 10.1515/tl-2016-0001
Downloaded from PubFactory at 08/03/2016 05:33:58PM
via University of St Andrews Scotland
inclusive one is dominant in the negative environment in (5)b: in (5)a, the
sentence with and is more informative than the sentence with or; in (5)b, it’s
the other way around: I doubt that I’ll invite Ann or Mary (or both) entails in
particular that I doubt that I’ll invite both Ann and Mary).8
In this brief discussion of human language, we were led on the basis of truth-
conditional data to posit a division of labor between the literal, or ‘semantic’
meaning of sentences, and further ‘pragmatic’ inferences obtained by taking into
account competition among possible utterances. Recent psycholinguistics has
taken this question much further by showing that this division of labor is
‘psychologically real’ (see for instance Chemla et al. 2014a, 2014b).9 For us, the
key lesson is that detailed formal semantic studies can play a key role in
delineating cognitive modules whose scientific reality can be further probed
with other means.
2.2 Monkey fragments
Formal linguistics greatly benefited from the method of fragments, in which
some subparts of the syntax and semantics of a language are explicitly defined,
often in greatly simplified form – but with the idea that they can in principle be
refined and extended to cover rich and sophisticated phenomena. As it happens,
some of the monkey languages we will study are simple enough that a ‘frag-
ment’ could aim to represent the entire language. But before we get into the
complexity of actual data, it will prove helpful to develop a fragment for an
imaginary language that shares some salient properties with the real monkey
languages we will turn to shortly; this will allow us to make some useful
notational points along the way.
Let us start with form. Our fictional language contains just two words, krak
and hok, and they can be concatenated as pure series of kraks and pure series of
hoks – and nothing else (this is meant as a much simplified version of the
Campbell’s language we’ll study later). It can be defined as in (7), where we
have used the ‘rewrite’ rules common in contemporary syntax (these rules are
8 See for instance Schlenker (to appear) for a survey of some standard approaches to the
analysis of or.
9 For instance, it was found that the ‘enriched’, exclusive reading of or takes time to process, as
is natural if it involves negating the alternative with and (see for instance Chevallier et al. 2008);
and also that children acquire that ‘bare’ meaning before the ‘enriched’ one – again a natural
result if comparing the sentence with its alternatives is somehow taxing (see for instance Singh
et al. 2015).
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‘context free’: the left-hand side does not need to specify in which contexts the
rewriting is permissible).
(7) Syntax
a. Lexicon: Words are just: krak, hok
b. Syntax: Sentences are of the form: krak+ ( = arbitrary sequences of
krak), hok+ (arbitrary sequences of hok). The language is
defined by the (right-linear) grammar:
S → K, H
K → krak K, krak
H → hok H, hok
A formal remark will prove useful later. While this very simple language can be
defined by way of a context-free grammar, the latter is of a very special form, in
which non-terminal nodes only appear at the far right of all productions, as in:
krak K, hok H. Such ‘right-linear grammars’ can be shown to generate exactly the
‘regular languages’ (e. g. Hopcroft et al. 2001). These, in turn, can be defined by
the simple operations in (8).
(8) The regular languages based on a lexicon Lex are those that can be
obtained from a-c:
a. The empty language Ø is a regular language.
b. For each a ∈ Lex, {a} is a regular language.
c. If A and B are regular languages, then A ∪ B (the union of A and B), AB
(the set of strings obtained by concatenating any element from A with
an element from B), and A* (the set of strings made of 0 or more
concatenated occurrences of elements of A) are regular languages.
In our initial discussion of Black-and-White Colobus calls above, we defined
languages by listing (or taking the union of) sublanguages involving singleton
words, concatenation and repetition, with the patterns: s, sr+, r+. It is immediate
that this is a regular language defined on the basis of the lexicon {s, r} by: s ∪ srr*
∪ rr*.10 The only differences between this notation and that in (8) are that we
listed patterns instead of using the sign ∪, and that we used + to define patterns
with at least one occurrence of a (possibly) repeated symbol, whereas * allows for
0 occurrences too; this is the reason the pattern sr+ corresponds to srr* and the
pattern r+ corresponds to rr*. Thus the languages we can define with our earlier
10 We follow standard practice in writing s for the language made of the singleton {s}, and
similar for r and {r}.
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operations are all the regular languages. The languages we will discuss in this
piece will all have this property, and hence we will henceforth use these simple
operations rather than the more cumbersome formalism of context-free grammars.
Let us now turn to the semantics. Our toy language treats krak as a general
alert call, and hok as an eagle alarm call, as seen in (9)a. We use standard
notations from model-theoretic semantics; for instance,〚krak〛a is the semantic
value of the word ( = call) krak under an alarm parameter a. We take individual
calls to be appropriate or inappropriate in a given context, and use the standard
terms ‘true’ and ‘false’ to characterize this bipartition. The alarm parameter will
ensure that repetitions of a call aren’t entirely vacuous, as each call will have the
effect of raising the value of the alarm parameter.
(9) Semantics
Abbreviation: iff stands for ‘if and only if’.
a. If a is an alarm parameter ( ≥0):
〚krak〛a = true iff there is an alert and the alarm level is ≥ a.
〚hok〛a = true iff there is an eagle and the alarm level is ≥ a.
b. If a is an alarm parameter ( ≥0), for any word w and string of words S,
〚wS〛a = true iff 〚w〛a = true and 〚S〛a + 1 = true.
c. Truth
A sentence S is true (in a given situation) just in case 〚S〛0 = true.
The lexical rules for krak and hok in (9)a are self-explanatory, except for the
part that concerns the role of the alarm parameter, which will matter when
several calls are combined. How should combinations be treated? In the sim-
plest analysis, we could define a (conjunctive) semantics whereby the concate-
nation wS of a word w and a sentence S is true just in case w is true and S is true
as well; in effect, this would correspond to the null hypothesis that each call
separately contributes its informational content to a sequence, with a trivial rule
of combination ( = each call counts as a separate utterance). But this would come
at a cost: krak, krak krak, and krak krak krak would all end up with the very
same meaning. In the primate literature, it is sometimes asserted that the calling
rate is an increasing function of the level of urgency of the threat (e. g. Lemasson
et al. 2010 on Campbell’s monkeys). We capture this fact in a simplified way in
(9)b by postulating that each call raises the value of an all-purpose alarm
parameter. Thus wS evaluated under a value a of the alarm parameter is true
only in case S is true under the raised alarm parameter a + 1. And each elemen-
tary call is true under a value a of the alarm parameter just in case the alarm
level in the situation is at least a. The definition of truth in (9)c just adds that the
initial value of the alarm parameter is taken to be 0.
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Let us illustrate this fragment with two examples, hok hok and krak krak
krak, discussed in (10).
(10) a.〚hok hok〛0 = true
iff 〚hok〛0 = true and 〚hok〛1 = true,
iff there is an eagle and the alarm level is ≥ 0 and the alarm level is ≥ 1,
iff there is an eagle and the alarm level is ≥ 1.
b.〚krak krak krak〛0 = true
iff 〚krak〛0 = true and 〚krak krak〛1 = true,
iff [krak〛0 = true and 〚krak〛1 = true and 〚krak〛2 = true,
iff there is an alert and the alarm level is ≥ 0 and the alarm level is ≥ 1
and the alarm level is ≥ 2, iff there is an alert and the alarm level is ≥ 2.
Our semantics in (9)a was set up in such a way that hok is strictly more
informative than krak – at least on the natural assumption that eagles cause
alerts, and that there are non-eagle-related situations that also do so. We will
find this asymmetric pattern of entailment in all the natural systems to be
discussed below, and it will be important to posit that when one call is strictly
more informative than another, the most informative one is used whenever possi-
ble. This is in effect the very same rule of competition we stated above (in (6)c) to
account for the ‘enrichment’ of the meaning of (inclusive) or by way of competi-
tion between or and and. Because this enrichment is based on differential
patterns of informativity among competing sentences, we will label it the
‘Informativity Principle’. It is defined in two steps, as in (11)–(12): first, in (11)
we define the competitors S’ of a sentence S – in essence, any sentence obtained
from S by replacing kraks with hoks or hoks with kraks; second, in (12) we posit
that if S is uttered and S’ is an alternative to S but is strictly more informative
than S, one can infer that S’ is false.11
(11) Alternatives
Any sentence S’ is an alternative to a sentence S if S and S’ are both
produced by the syntactic rules of the language, and S’ can be obtained
from S by replacing any number of kraks with (the same number of) hoks
and/or by replacing any number of hoks with kraks.
11 In our pragmatic analysis of ‘real’ Campbell’s calls, we will make use of similar rules of
competition, but solely at the single call level, for reasons to be outlined below. On the other
hand, competitions among entire sentences will play a role in our pragmatic analysis of Putty-
nosed calls.
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(12) Informativity Principle
If a sentence S was uttered and if S’ is (i) an alternative to S, and (ii) strictly
more informative than S (i.e. asymmetrically entails S), infer that S’ is false.
This simple pragmatic rule will already have an interesting consequence.
Suppose that the main predators are leopards and eagles. While krak may
have all sorts of uses in non-predatory contexts (because it is a general call),
in most predatory ones it will single out leopards: if krak is uttered, (12) will
trigger the inference that hok was not applicable, and hence that the situation is
not eagle-related – hence if there is a predator, it must be a leopard. This logic
will be used several times in the analyses we develop below.
A cautionary note is in order at this point. We saw above that, depending on
one’s notion of language, it may take very little for a species to have a ‘language’.
Even in the domain of semantics, we argued that as soon as a signal has some
informational content, we can define a semantics for it –though of course the
exercise may be more or less interesting depending on the situation. But one
might think that when one posits a pragmatic rule such as the Informativity
Principle, things are different: doesn’t that require sophisticated abilities to
represent other minds? Not really. Grice’s analysis of or and neo-Gricean mod-
ifications of it were based on the assumption that the speaker is cooperative and
thus selects from a set of alternatives the one that will be most informative to the
addressee. Stated in this way, the analysis makes reference to a theory of other
minds. But the logic of informativity requires far less: similar results can be
obtained by just assuming that the semantics makes available a relation ‘is
strictly more informative than’ on some sentences that are alternatives to each
other, and that some mechanism (deterministically or probabilistically) selects the
most informative sentence that is true in the situation at hand; the competition
principle can be stated both for the speaker and for the hearer, as is done in (13).
(13) Informativity Principle without a theory of mind
Assume that the semantics yields a relation ‘is strictly more informative
than’ on some sentences that are alternatives to each other.
Underinformative sentences are prohibited by the following rules:
Speaker: Do not utter S in a situation w if a strictly more informative
alternative S’ is true in w.
Hearer: If you hear S in a situation w, infer that every strictly more
informative alternative S’ is false in w.
Note that other pragmatic phenomena arguably do require a theory of mind.
For instance, one does not usually go out uttering trivialities; while it might be
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informative to say ‘You are sitting on a broken chair’ (when this is not obvious),
one doesn’t usually tell someone: ‘You are sitting on a chair’, as this is some-
thing the interlocutor is likely to know. In order to draw the distinction between
trivial and non-trivial statements, the speaker must be able to represent the
interlocutor’s belief state.12 As mentioned in Section 1.2, data from Crockford
et al. (2012) suggest that chimpanzees obey a version of the prohibition against
trivial statements – which might be suggestive of a theory of other minds. But
since no representation of other minds is required to implement the
Informativity Principle, our analyses will be neutral on this issue.
2.3 Case studies
In the remainder of this article, we will apply the methods we just outlined to
some case studies. In each, one of the main questions pertains to the division of
labor between syntax, semantics, pragmatics, and properties of the environmental
context (‘world’ knowledge and context change); different answers are given for
different call systems. In Section 3, we summarize recent results on the alert
calls of Campbell’s monkeys (Schlenker et al. 2014); as mentioned, this system
includes a root/suffix distinction, and is apparently subject to dialectal variation
in the semantics; we show that a proper use of the Informativity Principle might
hold the key to an adequate analysis. In Section 4, we revisit from a formal
perspective claims made by Arnold, Zuberbühler and colleagues about pyow-
hack sequences in Putty-nosed monkeys. As mentioned, these initially seem to
require a non-compositional analysis, but we argue with Schlenker et al. (2016)
that a compositional alternative can be given on the basis of a weak semantics
and several pragmatic principles; a crucial innovation is an Urgency Principle,
which dictates that calls that provide information about the location of a threat
should come before calls that don’t. In Section 5, we summarize the theoretical
problems raised by Black-and-White Colobus monkey calls, which include
snorts, roars, but also snort-roar sequences which have a broader distribution
than either individual snorts or pure roar sequences; we tentatively argue that
snort-roar sequences are complex calls whose meaning is not compositionally
derived from the meanings of snort and roar. In Section 6, we revisit rich data
from Cäsar et al. (2013) on alarm sequences produced by Titi monkeys. With just
two calls, these sequences encode sophisticated information about both
12 For human languages, a more sophisticated capacity is usually assumed, namely the ability
to determine what is common belief between the speaker and addressee; see for instance
Stalnaker (2002) for discussion.
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predator type and predator location. While these facts might seem to argue for a
complex syntax/semantics interface, we argue that natural assumptions about
the environmental context make it possible to devise a very simple semantic
account. Finally, we discuss the prospects of an ‘evolutionary monkey linguis-
tics’ in Section 7, and summarize our main conclusions in Section 8.
3 Campbell’s monkeys: ‘Dialectal’ variation
or call competition?
Here we will only summarize the main results of the analysis of Schlenker et al.
(2014), which builds on Ouattara et al. (2009a, 2009b) as well as on original data
collected by Arnold and Keenan. Our main goal is to highlight the theoretical
mileage that one can get out of the interplay between a simple semantics and
the Informativity Principle.
3.1 Introduction to Campbell’s semantics
Summarizing, the morphology can be defined as in (14) and (15).13
(14) Roots and affixes
a. Roots: boom, hok, krak
b. Bound affixes: -oo
(15) Lexicon
a. Every root is a word.
b. If R is a root different from boom, R-oo is a word.
Of these calls, boom seems to have a regular syntax, as it usually appears as a
single pair of calls at the beginning of sequences. It also seems to have a regular
meaning of non-predation – a meaning which is clear enough to be understood
by Diana monkeys, which live sympatrically with Campbell’s monkeys but do
not themselves have booms (specifically, Zuberbühler 2002 shows that Diana
13 As noted in footnote 3, we leave wak out of our discussions because it is not clearly an
independent call (Keenan et al. 2013 argued on the basis of a clustering analysis that it might be
better treated as an instance of hok).
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monkeys stop being alarmed by Campbell’s predator sequences if these are
prefixed with boom boom). The remaining (simple and complex) calls function
as alert calls of various kinds. Of note for present purposes, Schlenker et al.
(2014) analyzed data from two sites and found an apparent dialectal difference.
In brief: data were collected in the Tai forest, where Campbell’s monkeys have as
main predators leopards and eagles, and on Tiwai island, where eagles are
present but leopards haven’t been seen for decades. Strikingly, what initially
seems to be a leopard alarm in the Tai forest is used as general call on Tiwai
island.
A very preliminary description of call use can be given as follows:
(16) Informal description of the lexical meanings
a. boom boom: ‘this is not a situation of predation’
b. hok-oo: ‘there is an alert upwards’
c. hok: ‘there is an eagle’
d. krak-oo: ‘there is an alert’
e. krak: (i) ‘there is a leopard’ (Tai); (ii) ‘there is an alert’ (Tiwai)
We will come back in Section 7.2 to the uses of boom in Campbell’s monkeys
and in other cercopithecines. Here we focus on two of the main analytical
findings of recent research, pertaining to the uses of the suffix -oo and of the
root krak, which seems to be subject to dialectal variation. To facilitate the
discussion, we immediately provide a meaning for boom and especially hok.
Here I is the lexical interpretation function, M is a model (which one can think of
a site, e. g. the Tai forest or Tiwai island), and s is a situation of utterance.
(17) Meaning of boom
IM,s(boom-boom) = 1 iff there is a disturbance but no predator in s.
(18) Meaning of hok (preliminary)
IM,s(hok) = 1 iff there is an aerial predator in s.
3.2 The suffix -oo
Ouattara et al. 2009a analyzed -oo as a suffix attaching to the roots different
from boom. Kuhn et al. (2014) develop a mini-phonetic analysis that suggests
that -oo can reasonably be analyzed as a suffix, and Schlenker et al. (2014)
develop two possible analyses according to which -oo modifies in a regular
way the meaning of the root it attaches to.
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Phonetically, Kuhn et al. (2014) argue that the production of -oo requires
increased articulatory effort, a finding consistent with its analysis as a separate,
meaning-bearing morpheme. Two acoustic facts are noteworthy: first, -oo is
preceded by a short pause (averaging 0.060 s), indicating an obstruction of
airflow; second, -oo lacks higher formants that are present in the call stems (krak
or hok), thus displaying a spectral feature characteristic of nasalization. In light
of these facts, Kuhn et al. (2014) argue that the production of -oo involves
changing the passage through which air is flowing. Such a change would
require an additional articulatory gesture, making it implausible that -oo is an
indirect effect of independent articulatory pressures and thus strengthening the
robustness of a morphological analysis.
Turning to the semantics, Schlenker et al. (2014) relied on data collected by
Ouattara in field experiments (2009a, 2009b) and in naturalistic observations to
argue (in their initial theory) that -oo has the effect of broadening the meaning of
the root it attaches too, somewhat like the suffix -ish in greenish. Consider the
counts in (19): oo-modified forms (in hatched bars) occur in many environments
in which unmodified forms (open bars) do not occur. In particular, krak doesn’t
occur in Eagle, Inter-group, and Tree fall situations, but krak-oo does; and hok
doesn’t occur in Inter-group situations, but hok-oo does. The converse situation
(with an unmodified form occurring in an environment in which the modified
form doesn’t occur) doesn’t arise here.14
(19) Distribution of modified and unmodified forms in the dataset used in
Ouattara et al. 2009a, 2009b
In their initial theory, Schlenker et al. 2014 posited for -oo the semantics in (20).
14 Still, Schlenker et al. (2014) noted that in the two more recent datasets they focused on,
some facts went in the opposite direction: in Tai ‘Diana Leopard’ contexts and in Tiwai ‘predator
Eagle’ contexts, there are respectively 21 and 66 hoks, but no hok-oos.
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(20) Meaning of -oo (initial theory)
for any root R different from boom-boom, for any site M and situation of
utterance s,
IM, s(R–oo) = 1 iff there is a disturbance in s that licenses the same atten-
tional state as if IM, s(R) = 1.
Putting together the lexical rule for hok and the rule for -oo, we can obtain a
lexical meaning for hok-oo, as shown in (21):
(21) IM, s(hok–oo) = 1 iff there is a disturbance in s that licenses the same
attentional state as if IM, s(hok) = 1, iff there is a disturbance in s that
licenses the same attentional state as if there is an aerial predator in s.
In other words, hok-oo warns the hearer to be in the sort of attentional state that
one should be in for an aerial predator, but without providing the information
that there is in fact an aerial predator. So this could be a message to pay
attention to what is going on upwards without a commitment to the presence
of an aerial predator (but without excluding it either). It is immediate given this
definition that the meaning of hok-oo is broader than that of hok: the latter is
only made true if an aerial predator is present; while hok-oo is made true in the
same situations, but also in ones in which there is no predator.
It is clear that in this analysis R-oo has a weaker meaning than R; on the
assumption (made throughout) that R has a propositional meaning, R will
asymmetrically entail R-oo. If this analysis is on the right track (which in view
of the considerations below isn’t clear), it will be impossible to analyze the
meaning of R-oo as the conjunction of the R and some hypothetical root -oo, as
the latter analysis would entail that R-oo is stronger than R.
3.3 The meaning of krak
Schlenker et al. (2014) showed on the basis of comparable data collected in field
experiments in Tai and on Tiwai that there was a major difference between the
uses of the call krak on the two sites. In brief: krak was primarily used as a
leopard call in Tai, but it was used as a general call on Tiwai. In particular,
despite the fact that the main ecological difference between Tai and Tiwai
pertains to the absence of leopards on the latter site, a significant difference
was found in calling behavior to eagles:15
15 Neither Schlenker et al. (2014) nor the present summary explain why hok-oo is rare on Tiwai.
24 Philippe Schlenker et al.
 - 10.1515/tl-2016-0001
Downloaded from PubFactory at 08/03/2016 05:33:58PM
via University of St Andrews Scotland
(22) Number of calls of different types in response to different types of play-
back stimuli (a) in Tai and (b) on Tiwai - aggregated version
(a) Tai
(b) Tiwai
Schlenker et al. (2014) went on to develop and compare two possible analyses of
this ‘dialectal’ difference. The first model accounts for the difference between Tai
and Tiwai by way of different lexical entries for krak. The second model gives the
same underspecified entry to krak in both locations ( = general alert call), but it
makes use of a competition mechanism akin to scalar implicatures. In Tai,
strengthening yields a meaning close to dangerous, terrestrial predator and
turns out to single out leopards. On Tiwai, strengthening yields a nearly contra-
dictory meaning due to the absence of ground predators, and only the
unstrengthened meaning is used.
3.3.1 Dialectal differences in the use of krak?
The first theory explored in Schlenker et al. (2014) was that krak is genuinely
subject to dialectal variation; the basic idea was that in Tai krak has a leopard-
related meaning, whereas on Tiwai it is a general alert call. But a theory-internal
problem and an empirical observation conspired to suggest that the real story is
more complex.
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First, on the assumption that the meaning of krak-oo is derived from the
meanings of krak and -oo, it is unlikely that a leopard meaning for krak could
yield a general meaning for krak-oo. To be concrete, given the lexical entry in
(20), if krak is applicable just in case there is a leopard in the relevant situation,
we would expect krak-oo to be used when one should pay attention to a threat
coming from the ground, in accordance with the reasoning in (23), combined
with the fact that Campbell’s monkeys are arboreal and leopards come from
lower down (even when they climb).
(23) Suppose that IM, s(krak) = 1 iff there is a leopard in s. Then by the same
reasoning as in (21), IM, s(krak–oo) = 1 iff in s there is a disturbance that
licenses the same attentional state as if there is a leopard in s.
Since leopards aren’t expected to fly, we would expect krak-oo not to occur in
eagle alarms – which is an incorrect prediction: both in field experiments and in
naturalistic observations, eagle alarms do trigger the use of krak-oo.
Second, even in the Tai forest there are some instances of krak that do
not seem to be leopard-related. More specifically, on the assumption that in
Tai krak has a leopard meaning and that hok has an eagle meaning, Schlenker
et al. (2014) found significantly more ‘inappropriate’ uses of krak than of hok.
For both reasons, an analysis based on dialectal variation is more complex than
meets the eye. While positing a general meaning for krak for Tiwai island would
seem to be appropriate, in the Tai forest we would need to posit an ambiguity:
– a large number or possibly all instances of krak-oo should be derived from
the same general-purpose krak as on Tiwai island, notated in (24)a as krak1;
– most (but not all) instances of the bare call krak should be realizations of
the leopard-related root, notated in (24)b as krak2.
(24) a. Tai and Tiwai:
IM, s(krak
1) = 1 iff there is a disturbance in s.
b. Tai only
IM, s(krak
2) = 1 iff there is a leopard in s.
3.3.2 Pragmatic strengthening in the use of krak?
These complexities led Schlenker et al. (2014) to explore an alternative analysis.
In a nutshell, they proposed that pragmatic strengthening was responsible for the
‘leopard’ meaning of krak in the Tai forest. They noted that the strengthening
operation would lead to a near-contradictory meaning on Tiwai island, and
explained by a principle of ‘contradiction-avoidance’ the fact that on Tiwai
this strengthening did not take place.
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Crucially, in order to develop this analysis, Schlenker et al. (2014) had to
revise the lexical entries discussed above. In a nutshell, they took krak-oo to
refer to weak krak-licensing threats, and hok to function as a non-terrestrial alert
call. The goal was to ensure that both would be more informative than krak, with
the result that the Informativity Principle would enrich krak into krak and not
krak-oo (hence a non-weak threat) and not hok (hence a terrestrial threat), as
outlined in (25). This, in turn, was desirable in order to guarantee that the
enriched meaning of krak could single out serious ground threats, and hence
leopards. In (25) and subsequently, we use an underline (e. g. krak) to indicate
the strengthened meaning of a call.
(25) Desired result
krak = krak and not krak-oo and not hok
= disturbance and non-weak and terrestrial
The asymmetric entailments among calls are represented in (26). They
obtain given the lexical entries in (27), which for reasons we will come to shortly
were not just relativized to a site M and a situation of utterance s, but also a time
of utterance t. Importantly, although krak-oo and hok-oo refer to weaker threats
than krak and hok, they are logically stronger: if there is a weak krak-type threat,
then a fortiori there is krak-type threat. The derivation of the meanings of the
complex calls is given in (28).
(26)
krak
krak-oo hok
hok-oo
(27) Lexical Semantics
For any site M, situation s and time t,
a. IM, s, t(krak) = 1 iff at t the caller of s is alert to a disturbance.
b. IM, s, t(hok) = 1 iff at t the caller of s is alert to a disturbance whose source
is non-terrestrial.
c. IM, s, t(boom-boom) = 1 iff at t the caller of s is alert to a disturbance but
not of a predator.
d. for any root R except boom-boom,
IM, s, t(R-oo) = 1 iff at t the caller of s is alert to a disturbance that
licenses R and isn’t strong among disturbances that license R.
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(28) For any site M, situation s and time t,
a. IM, s, t(krak-oo) = 1 iff at t the caller of s is alert to a disturbance that
licenses krak and isn’t strong among disturbances that license krak,
iff at t the caller of s is alert to a disturbance that isn’t strong among all
disturbances.
b. IM, s, t(hok-oo) = 1 iff at t the caller of s is alert to a disturbance that
licenses hok and isn’t strong among disturbances that license hok,
iff at t the caller of s is alert to a disturbance whose source is non-
terrestrial, and which isn’t strong among those whose source is non-
terrestrial.
The Informativity Principle is exactly as it was in our earlier discussions in (12),
but we will apply it to individual calls rather than to entire sentences and
discourses. The reason is in part practical: apart from the fixed position of
boom, we have little understanding of the syntax of Campbell’s calls, and
even the distinction between sentences and discourses (if it is applicable) is
not at all obvious. So at this point we will take each simple call (boom-boom,
krak, hok) and each complex call (krak-oo, hok-oo) to function as a sentence; and
we will assume that all non-boom calls are alternatives to each other. The
Informativity Principle in (12) applies to the (one-word) sentences and their
alternatives defined in (29). Combining the literal meaning of a call and the
further inferences obtained from the Informativity Principle, we get the
‘strengthened meaning’ defined in (30). Crucially, enrichment happens at the
level of entire calls, not roots, with the effect that -oo modifies the literal (and
general) meaning of krak, as is desired.
(29) Alternatives
Sentences are single (simple or complex) calls, and krak, krak-oo, hok,
hok-oo are all alternatives to each other.
(30) Strengthened meanings
For every word w, we (abuse notation and) write as w the strengthened
version of w, obtained by adding to the literal meaning of w the inferences
obtained by applying the Informativity Principle. Its meaning is given by:
for every situation s and time t,
〚w〛M, s, t = 1 iff 〚w〛M, s, t = 1 and for all w’ ∈ Alt(w), if w’ entails w,
〚w’〛M, s, t = 0
where Alt(w) is the set of alternatives of w.
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With these rules in place, we do derive the desired result sketched in (25). In
fact, not only does the strengthening of krak yield a ‘serious terrestrial distur-
bance’ meaning, but the strengthening of hok yields a ‘serious aerial distur-
bance’ meaning. Both appear to be appropriate for leopard and eagle situations
respectively in the Tai forest.
(31) Strengthening krak and hok
a. 〚krak〛M, s, t = 1 iff〚krak〛M, s, t = 1 and〚krak-oo〛M, s, t = 0 and
〚hok〛M, s, t = 0 and
〚hok-oo〛M, s, t = 0 (since krak-oo, hok and hok-oo all entail krak),
= 1 iff 〚krak〛M, s, t = 1 and 〚krak-oo〛M, s, t = 0 and
〚hok〛M, s, t = 0 (since hok is weaker than hok-oo)
= 1 at t the caller of s is alert to a disturbance but not to
one that is weak among all disturbances and not to one
whose source is non-terrestrial,
or roughly: = 1 iff at t the caller of s is alert to a terrestrial
disturbance which is serious among all
disturbances.
b. 〚hok〛M, s, t = 1 iff〚hok〛M, s, t = 1 and〚hok-oo〛M, s, t = 0 (since hok-oo
entails hok)
= 1 iff at t the caller of s is alert to a disturbance whose
source is non-terrestrial but not to a disturbance that
isn’t strong among all disturbances whose source is
non-terrestrial,
or roughly: = 1 iff at t the caller of s is alert to a serious aerial
disturbance.
In order to explain why strengthening fails to apply on Tiwai island,
Schlenker et al. (2014) rely on an assumption pertaining to the environment,
combined with a rule of ‘strengthening avoidance’ in case the result of
strengthening is (nearly) contradictory. The environmental assumption is that
there are very few serious ground threats for Campbell’s monkeys on Tiwai
island (for lack of leopards). The rule of strengthening avoidance is given
in (32); it just states that strengthening should be avoided if it gives rise to a
contradiction.
(32) Strengthening application and strengthening avoidance
a. For a given site M, if〚w〛M, s, t = 0 for every situation s and every time t,
one should interpret an utterance of w without strengthening.
b. Otherwise, a word w should in most cases be interpreted as 〚w〛.
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In this way, the apparent dialectal variation across Tai and Tiwai is explained on
the basis of a system which, for all we know, might be entirely innate. In the
end, the lexical entries, but also the strengthening rule and the rule of strength-
ening avoidance could be exactly the same on both sites, though they produce
different results because strengthening avoidance is triggered by properties of
the site at large.
Finally, the analysis isn’t without its technical problems. The heart of the
matter is that krak-oo occurred in all sorts of environments that cannot be taken
to correspond to weak threats – for instance eagle alarms. In many cases, it is
preceded by more specific alert calls. But the combination of, say, hok (on its
strengthened meaning) with krak-oo should be predicted to be a quasi-contra-
diction. The solution is to posit that the calls reflect the caller’s subjective state
at the very moment at which it was uttered, with the auxiliary assumption that
this subjective alarm state can easily change and typically decreases gradually
after a threat is perceived. For this reason, the lexical semantics must be
relativized not just to a site M and a situation of utterance s, but also a time
of utterance t. In effect, this means that each call counts as a separate utterance.
If we wish to compute the overall semantic contribution of an entire sequence,
we must take the conjunction of calls evaluated at different times, as is done in
(33)b. We simultaneously ensure in our rules that longer sequences are indica-
tive of a higher alarm level; in effect, the time parameter in this analysis takes
over the function of the alarm parameter in our initial (lexicalist) theory; speci-
fically, the equivalent of the ‘alarm’ level at time t can be computed by con-
sidering the value of t–time(s), where time(s) is the time of the situation s (and
thus the time at the start of the sequence).
(33) Compositional Semantics (with a time parameter replacing the alarm
parameter) For any site M, situation s (whose time of occurrence is time
(s)), time t, word w, and string of words S,
a. 〚w〛M, s, t = 1 iff IM, s, t(w) = 1 and the alarm level is
16 at least t–time(s).
b. 〚wS〛M, s, t = 1 iff 〚w〛M, s, t = 1 and 〚S〛M, s, t + 1 = 1.
3.4 Conclusions and perspectives
Three main conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of Campbell’s calls.
16 We could relativize this further to the caller’s epistemic state, by having: … the caller of s is
aware of an alarm level of at least t – time(s).
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(i) Complex calls
First, -oo has a phonetics, a distribution and arguably a semantics that are
consistent with a suffixal analysis. If correct, there are primitive elements of
morphological complexity in male Campbell’s calls. Is this an isolated case?
Veselinović et al. (2014) suggest that further cases can be found. Following
Candiotti et al. (2012), they show that the social calls of Diana monkey females
arguably include complex calls as well. First, some of the calls are produced in
what Candiotti et al. (2012) term merged association; this means that there is no
discernible pause between the two calls. Thus in addition to individual calls L, H,
R, A, the repertoire contains 2-call units LA, HA, and RA. Now of course this could
be a low-level articulatory phenomenon, but Veselinović et al. argue that this is
not so. One of their key arguments is syntactic: as is the case in all of the monkey
languages we will consider, there are numerous patterns of repetition; but cru-
cially, in some cases repetition targets a complex unit, such as LA LA LA LA etc.
This suggests that there is some reality to the existence of such 2-call units. They
argue thatA functions both as a separate root and as a suffix, with a rule governing
the distribution of the root A, which is always sequence-initial. While the authors
do not exhibit a semantic difference between the root A and the affix A, they make
an interesting evolutionary argument: female Campbell’s monkeys arguably have
calls that are similar to and probably phylogenetically related to those of female
Diana monkeys. Female Campbell’s monkeys have a counterpart of the A-suffixed
LA call, as well as a counterpart of the L call, but they do not have the A call as an
independent root – which might suggest that treating the two as different objects
within Diana monkeys is not unreasonable. As we will see in Section 4, pyow-hack
sequences have been analyzed by Arnold and Zuberbühler as complex calls of
sorts, although there are alternative theoretical possibilities. And as we will see in
Section 5, the snort-roar sequences of Black-and-White Colobus monkeys might
also have to be analyzed as complex calls, with a non-compositional semantics.
But these are admittedly controversial cases, and thus -oo-modified calls in male
Campbell’s monkeys and the Candiotti/Veselinović cases in female Diana mon-
keys might provide stronger arguments for the existence of complex calls.
(ii) Variation
While krak is used differently in the Tai forest and on Tiwai island, positing that
there is a dialectal difference between the two sites is just one of at least two
possible theories. The existence of a bona fide dialectal difference would go
against the claim – often taken as a null hypothesis – that monkey calls are
entirely innate (see also Wheeler and Fischer 2012). We have nothing in principle
against the possibility that their use can be in part learned, but in view of our
analysis this conclusion is premature: a sophisticated mechanism of pragmatic
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enrichment might account for the appearance of dialectal variation without
postulating that different meanings are acquired on the two sites (though prag-
matic rules are applied differently because of the general principle of contra-
diction avoidance, which interacts with the ecology of the sites).
(iii) Semantics vs. Pragmatics
An essential theme in the debate between the two accounts of Campbell’s calls is
the precise division of labor between semantics and pragmatics. The second
theory made heavy use of the Informativity Principle, which produced interest-
ing results because krak was enriched by competition with both hok and krak-oo.
While Informativity will have less striking results in our other case studies,
pragmatic principles will prove to be key to obtain empirically adequate the-
ories: quite generally, we will find that monkey languages include a general
alert call and one or several more specific ones, notably raptor-related ones; but
crucially the general alert is almost never given at the beginning of an eagle-
triggered discourse. The Informativity Principle offers a very natural explanation
of why this is so.
A further remark should be added from a comparative perspective. Initially,
the Tai data suggested that krak is a ground predator call while hok is an aerial
predator call. Upon closer inspection, theory-internal considerations relating to
krak-oo, as well as the data from Tiwai, suggest that krak might have a general
alert meaning in the end. This dovetails nicely with typological considerations
arising from comparative studies of primate calls. As Wheeler and Fischer (2012)
note, “across species it tends to be the call associated with terrestrial predators
that is given in other contexts, whereas the call associated with aerial predators
tends to be context-specific and meet the criteria of functional reference”
(Wheeler and Fischer 2012: 200). While this just seems to be a tendency, it is
interesting to note that the Campbell pattern, which might initially have
appeared as an exception, confirms the generalization in the end.
4 Putty-nosed monkeys: non-compositionality
or pragmatic enrichment?
For lack of understanding of the syntax, our analysis of Campbell’s sequences
almost entirely took place at the call level. By contrast, male Putty-nosed monkey
calls display simple syntactic patterns, as shown by Arnold and Zuberbühler
(2006a, 2006b, 2008, 2012, 2013). So we will now be in a position to ask more
precise questions about the syntax/semantics interface in a monkey language.
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4.1 The puzzle of pyow-hack sequences
In a nutshell, the main theoretical problem is as follows. Male putty-nosed
monkeys have two main alert calls, pyows ( =P) and hacks ( =H).17 While
pyows have a broad distribution suggestive of a general call, hacks are often
indicative of eagles. Arnold and Zuberbühler showed that putty-nosed monkeys
sometimes produce distinct pyow-hack sequences made of a small number of
pyows followed by a small number of hacks (P+H+); and these were shown both
in quantitative observational data and in field experiments to be predictive of
group movement. Arnold and Zuberbühler claimed that pyow-hack sequences
are syntactically combinatorial but not semantically compositional because the
meaning of the sequences can’t be derived from the meanings of their compo-
nent parts. From the perspective of our earlier discussions, it would make equal
sense to say that pyow-hack sequences are phonologically complex but lexically
simple; or that they are morphologically complex but receive a meaning at the
whole word level. The reason Arnold and Zuberbühler do not use this terminol-
ogy and speak instead of syntactically complex sequences interpreted as idioms
is that pyow-hack sequences are relatively slow, with pauses between calls; and
that they are not fully stereotyped: they involve a varying number of pyows
followed by a varying number of hacks.
Of course this very observation suggests that the whole-sequence analysis of
the meaning of pyow-hack sequences might be incorrect to begin with. In this
section, we briefly compare two theories of this phenomenon (see Schlenker et al.
2016 for further details). One formalizes and modifies the non-compositional
theory. The other presents a semantically compositional alternative, based on
weak meanings for pyow (‘general alert’) and hack (roughly, ‘non-ground move-
ment’), combined with pragmatic principles of competition. As in our discussion
of Campbell’s monkeys, we make use of an ‘Informativity Principle’, whereby
more informative sequences are preferred to less informative ones. But a crucial
innovation is an ‘Urgency Principle’ which mandates that calls that provide
information about the nature/location of a threat must come before calls that
don’t. Semantically, pyow-hack sequences are compatible with any kind of situa-
tion involving (moving) aerial predators or (arboreal) movement of the monkeys
themselves. But in the former situation, hacks provide information about the
location of a threat, and hence should appear at the beginning of sequences. As a
result, pyow-hack sequences can only be used for non-risk-related situations
17 They also have a boom call, which is produced very differently and is not indicative of alerts;
it will play no role in the present discussion.
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involving movement, hence a possible inference that they (often) involve group
movement. While it is too early to adjudicate this debate, we will argue that a
formal analysis of the competing theories should help produce new predictions to
be tested in future field studies.
Some of the main generalizations are summarized in (34). Eagle responses
are predominantly of two types: pure hack discourses, made only of hacks; and
transitional discourses that start with hack sentences and at some point transi-
tion to series of pyow sentences. Leopard-related discourses are predominantly
made of pyows. But they may also include sentences (illustrated in (35)) with a
small number of pyows followed by a small number of hacks – called pyow-hack
sequences in the literature (with our terminology, they are pyow-hack sentences,
although in this case we will often use the more established terminology of
pyow-hack sequences). A few instances of this pattern are also found in Eagle-
related contexts.
(34) Discourse and sentence types
Notation: P represents a pyow, H a hack. X+ refers to a repetition of call X
and _ represents a pause.
a. Pyow discourses: P+_…_ P+ (e.g. leopard contexts)
b. Hack discourses: H+_…_H+ (e.g. eagle contexts)
c. Transitional discourses: H+_…_H+_P+_…_P+ (e.g. eagle contexts)
(35) ‘Pyow-Hack sequences’: …P+H+… (trigger group movement)
(these are sentences that include a small number of P’s and a small
number of H’s, found within various discourse types)
Arnold and Zuberbühler convincingly established by observational data as
well as field experiments that pyow-hack sequences are predictive of group
movement. In particular, they established four important results, listed in (36).
(36) Properties of pyow-hack sequences (Arnold et al. 2006a, 2006b, 2008,
2012, 2013)
a. Natural pyow-hack sequences induce group movement far more than
either pyow or hack sequences.
b. The same result extends (in weakened form) to synthetic pyow-hack
sequences, put together from pure pyow and pure hack sequences.
c. Keeping the length constant, the precise composition of pyow-hack
sequences does not seem to affect the distance travelled. In particular,
comparable behavioral results were obtained with playbacks of
PPPHHH, PHHHHH, and PPPPPH.
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d. In naturally occurring discourses containing pyow-hack sequences,
there were indications of a positive relationship between the number
of ‘pyows’ and/or the total number of calls in a pyow-hack sequence
and the distance travelled by the group.
4.2 A non-compositional analysis
While Arnold and Zuberbühler’s positions on the meaning of individual pyows
and hacks has evolved over the years, they have consistently maintained that
pyow-hack sequences are syntactically combinatorial without being semantically
compositional, and they compared them to “idiomatic phrases such as kick the
bucket, in which the meaning of the expression is not derived from the meaning
of its constituent words but must be learned as a convention” (Arnold and
Zuberbühler 2012). As mentioned, it would make good conceptual sense from
Arnold and Zuberbühler’s perspective to treat pyow-hack sequences as being
phonologically but not morphologically or syntactically composed of individual
pyows and hacks – just like irate is made of syllables found in I and rate without
thereby being composed of these words. But two properties of pyow-hack
sequences are surprising for this analysis: first, they come in many non-stereo-
typed forms, as mentioned in (36)c; second, their time course is slow, with long
pauses between calls. A morphological analysis would be faced with the same
difficulties, hence Arnold and Zuberbühler talk of ‘syntactic’ combination in this
case. But the key point is that the semantics treats pyow-hack sequences as
unanalyzed units, as sketched in (37)-(38).
(37) Sentential syntax
Putty-nosed sentences are generated by the following rules: P+ , H+ , P+H+
(38) Non-compositional analysis of pyow-hack sequences (initial attempt)
a. 〚P〛= 1 iff there is an alert.
b. 〚H〛= 1 iff there is an aerial predator.
c. 〚PH〛=〚PPH〛=〚PHH〛=…=〚PPPPPPH〛=〚PHHHHHH〛= 1 iff
the group is moving.
d. Sentence-internal composition rule
If w is a word and S is a string of words,〚wS〛= 1 iff〚w〛=〚S〛= 1.
In Schlenker et al. (2016), it was noted that the non-compositional analysis
can be improved upon in four respects.
(i) As stated, the rule in (38)c is more disjunctive than needs be – it should
more explicitly mention all sequences of the form PmHn for m, n ≥ 1.
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(ii) The analysis in (38) gives rise to undesirable semantic ambiguities –
e. g. a sentence PH can be treated as a pyow-hack sequence, interpreted
by (38)c, or as the concatenation of P and H, interpreted by the other rules
in (38).
(iii) The analysis fails to explain why we almost never find discourses that
start with a series of pyows in response to an eagle stimulus: since pyows
are general alert calls, they should be applicable in that context too.
(iv) The analysis fails to predict a meaning difference for sentences that are
constructed on the same pattern – e. g. P+H+ – but contain a different total
number of calls. However the number of calls sometimes matters, as
mentioned in (36)d.
Schlenker et al. (2016) propose a reformulation of the non-compositional
analysis, one on which all repetitions (not just in pyow-hack sequences) are
semantically ignored except for purposes of computing the general level of
alarm – as is shown in (39).
(39) Non-compositional analysis of pyow-hack sequences (revised attempt)
For any n ≥ 1, k ≥ 1 and k < n,
a. for any sentence S of the form S=Pn, 〚S〛= 1 iff there is an alert and
the alarm level is at least n.
b. for any sentence S of the form S=Hn, 〚S〛= 1 iff there is a serious
raptor-related alert and the alarm level is at least n
c. for any sentence S of the form S=PkHn-k, 〚S〛= 1 iff the group is
moving and the alarm level is at least n.
No rule is disjunctive; since entire sentences are interpreted, no ambiguities
arise; and sentence length does provide information about the alarm level. This
takes care of Problems (i), (ii) and (iv). To address Problem (iii), the Informativity
Principle in (12) can once again be appealed to, combined with the natural
definition of alternatives in (40).
(40) Alternatives
Any sentence S’ is an alternative to a sentence S if S and S’ are both
produced by the syntactic rules of the language, and S’ can be obtained
from S by replacing any number of P’s with (the same number of) H’s and/
or by replacing any number of H’s with P’s.
On this view, then, pyows don’t occur at the beginning of eagle-triggered
discourses because in such situations hacks are more informative. But it remains
to explain why pyows can still be found towards the end of eagle-related
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discourses. Schlenker et al. 2016 posit that the level of alarm typically decays
over time, as stated in (41).
(41) Alarm Decay
The seriousness of an alarm usually decays over time.
4.3 A compositional alternative
Schlenker et al. (2016) argue that a compositional analysis of pyow-hack
sequences can be developed, but requires heavy use of pragmatic principles.18
Their analysis is in three steps.
First, they take hacks to have weak meanings, involving non-ground move-
ment. Second, they take the meaning of some sentences to be enriched by two
pragmatic mechanisms instead of just one. As before, the Informativity Principle
explains why P+ sentences cannot appear at the beginning of eagle-related
discourses. But in addition, they posit an Urgency Principle according to
which, within any sentence, calls that provide information about the location
of a threat should come before those that don’t. In eagle-related discourses, this
will mandate that hacks should come first. A pyow-hack sequence will carry the
literal (= semantic) meaning that there is some non-ground movement, but it will
also trigger the inference that this is not a threat-related one, for if so the hacks
should have come first. Third, they assume that world knowledge will yield the
further inference that an alert that involves non-ground movement but no threat
has a good chance of being related to group movement.
The sentential syntax and semantics are given in (42)-(43). The syntax now
allows for sentences of type H+P+ because these serve as alternatives to P+H+ when
the Urgency Principle is applied to the latter. This is a technical assumption, but it
does not appear to be entirely wrong-headed: while H+P+ sentences are less com-
mon than P+H+, they might exist nonetheless. As for the semantics, it makes use of
an alarmparameter, which is handled in the sameway as in our analysis Campbell’s
calls.
(42) Sentential syntax (revised)
Putty-nosed sentences are generated by the following rules:
P+, H+, P+H+, H+P+
18 See Collier et al. (2014) for alternative pragmatic analysis, and Schlenker et al. (2016) for a
comparison between these two approaches.
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(43) Sentential semantics (compositional – with an urgency parameter)
For any alarm parameter a ≥0,
a. 〚P〛a = 1 iff there is an alert and the alarm level is at least a.
b. 〚H〛a = 1 iff if there is a serious non-ground movement-related alert and
the alarm level is at least a.
c. If w is any call and S is any sequence,
〚wS〛a = 1 iff 〚w〛a = 1 and 〚S〛a+1 = 1.
It bears mentioning that ‘movement-related’ in (43)b is vague and should probably
be interpreted in terms of ‘impending movement’: this is useful for cases in which
H is in the end indicative of group movement, but also for eagle-related cases,
which need not involve a moving eagle19 but might rather indicate an impending
eagle attack. Note also that H is given a meaning of serious (non-ground move-
ment-related) alert in order to explain why H outcompetes P at the beginning of
eagle-related discourses but not at the end. The key assumption is that the inter-
action of Alarm Decay as in (41) and of the Informativity Principle is responsible
for the difference. The competition with H-sentences guarantees that P-sentences
come to trigger the inference that one is not faced with a serious non-ground
movement-related alert (or else H would have been used). This is still compatible
with the situation that arises at the end of eagle-related discourses, where the level
of alarm has presumably diminished enough that H stops being applicable.
Now the key innovation of the analysis is the Urgency Principle in (44),
combined with the assumption that the Informativity Principle takes into
account (or ‘is fed by’) the Urgency Principle, as is stated in (45).
(44) Urgency Principle
If a sentence S is triggered by a threat and contains calls that convey
information about its nature or location, no call that conveys such infor-
mation should be preceded by any call that doesn’t. As a result, if H’s
provide information about a threat, they cannot follow any P’s.
(45) Informativity Principle (revised)
The Informativity Principle in (12) takes into account the information
conveyed by the literal ( = semantic) meaning of sentences, combined
with the effects of the Urgency Principle.
The derivation of the use of pyow-hack sequences can then be given as in (46).
The Urgency Principle guarantees that pyow-hack sequences won’t be used in
19 In field experiments, model eagles are of course stationary, and ‘real’ eagles can be as well.
Still, hacks are produced.
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predator-related situations, as stated in (46)a, and assumptions about world
knowledge in (46)c can ensure that these sequences are mostly used in cases of
group movement. Finally, since after application of the Urgency Principle H+ and
H+P+ turn out to be less informative than P+H+ sequences, we can derive the result
that in group movement situations only pyow-hack sequences can be used.
(46) Derivation of the use of pyow-hack sequences
a. P+H+ sentences can be in violation of the Urgency Principle (i.e., in threat
situations), and hence their literal meaning is enriched by it. As a result,
they are only applicable in situations in which there is a serious non-
ground movement-related alert but not one which is due to a threat.
b. Unlike P+H+ sentences, H+ and H+P+ cannot be in violation of the
Urgency Principle, hence their meaning is not enriched by it. They are
thus strictly less informative than P+H+ sentences, and the Informativity
Principle guarantees that in situations in which there is a serious non-
ground movement-related alert but not one which is not due to a threat,
only P+H+ can be used.
c. Assumption about World Knowledge: The most common situations in
which there is a serious non-ground movement-related alert but not one
which is due to a threat involve group movement.
The compositional analysis is arguably more explanatory than the non-
compositional one, which simply stipulates the meaning of pyow-hack sequences.
But the compositional analysis could also make different predictions, since it yields
a much weaker meaning for pyow-hack sequences than ‘group movement’: world
knowledge is needed to ‘bridge the gap’. Thus the present theory leads one to expect
that pyow-hack sequences might be used for some non-threatening events that
involve non-ground movement (but are ‘serious’ enough to license the use of the
H call). One might for instance ask whether group encounters might trigger the use
of pyow-hack sequences – if indeed such group encounters are not seen as threats.
4.4 A non-referential variant of the compositional alternative
Arnold and Zuberbühler (2013) significantly revise their earlier findings on the use
of hacks; while they still treat pyows as being very general calls, they emphasize
that hacks can be used in a variety of ‘high arousal’ contexts that do not involve
aerial predators. We can formalize a version of their insights as in (47) (where the
boldfaced parts highlight the changes with respect to (43); note that we have not
modified our analysis of P, whose meaning is as general as before).
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(47) A non-referential semantics (compositional – with an alarm parameter)
wS is truea if and only if w is truea and S is truea+1
For any alarm parameter a ≥0,
a. 〚P〛a = 1 iff there is an alert and the alarm level is at least a.
b. 〚H〛a = 1 iff if there there is an alert causing high arousal and the
alarm level is at least a.
c. If w is any call and S is any sequence,〚wS〛a = 1 iff〚w〛a = 1 and〚S〛a
+1 = 1.
It is immediate that, as before, H is strictly more informative than P, and thus the
Informativity Principle could in principle apply to the new system in the same
way as to the old one. On some assumptions, some of the same predictions could
be derived as well. Formally, it might help to think of the non-referential analysis
as replacing notions of ‘high movement’ in physical space with ‘high degree of
emotional movement’ in internal cognition. On the additional assumption that
‘high arousal’ is often caused by things that are high in physical space – notably
eagles and tree falls – we will get partly similar results to those we had before.
This exercise can be completed in two steps: first, wemust connect ‘high arousal’
to environmental conditions that can be assessed in observation or in field experi-
ments; second, we must revise the statement of the Urgency Principle (as noted, the
Informativity Principle will apply in the same way to the new and to the old system).
(i) Assumptions connecting high arousal to the environment
We will assume that high arousal is caused by eagles but not by leopards, as the
latter are less dangerous. In addition, high arousal might be caused by events in
the monkeys’ immediate environment, which is usually arboreal. As a result,
there will generally be a close correspondence between events that would have
licensed H on the old and on the new theory.
(ii) Revision of the Urgency Principle
In our compositional (and referential) theory, theUrgencyPrinciple prescribed that in
a sentence triggered by a threat, calls that provide information about the nature/
locationof the threatmust comebefore those that don’t. This ideawon’t be applicable
to the new, non-referential theory. But a different intuition might yield the same
result: in case a hack is producedas a reaction to a threat, it is an emotive reaction and
should thus come before other calls – and hence before pyows. This is stated in (48):
(48) Urgency Principle (non-referential version)
If a sentence S is triggered by a threat, arousal-based calls in it must come
before non-arousal based calls.
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The intuition is that in a pyow-hack sequence, which is indicative of group
movement, the speaker might be in a high arousal state (and thus produce a
hack) because of his intention to move and/or because of an incoming event. By
contrast, in eagle contexts a hack is produced as a reaction to a scary event and
thus has to be produced first.
With these two assumptions, we can reproduce in an arousal-based system
most of the results of our earlier compositional analysis, though of course there is
now the possibility that hacks will be triggered by ground events or by events that
don’t involve movement (though if our assumptions are correct this will be rare).
While it is too early to fully adjudicate among these analyses, this exercise in
theory comparison highlights an important methodological point: the precise
semantic content of calls is often subject to much uncertainty, as different contents
may interact with world knowledge and the environment to yield the same beha-
vioral consequences. But our analyses are also based on more abstract notions,
such as the entailment and competition relations among calls; and these may
remain constant across theories that don’t quite posit the same contents at the
lexical level. This is the reason we have de-emphasized the issue of the ‘referential’
nature of calls, and highlighted instead the division of labor between semantics
and pragmatics and the role of the Informativity and of the Urgency Principle.
5 Colobus monkeys: complex calls?
In this section, we survey some interesting patterns in the calls of Black-and-
White Colobus monkeys (‘Guerezas’) – and we will add some remarks on King
Colobus monkeys (‘Polykomos’), which are closely related and have very similar
calling patterns. While our data are preliminary, these patterns pose an interesting
theoretical problem. Two call types, snort and roar,20 can appear either singly, or
together in sentences of the form snort-roar+ , without pause (‘snort-roar
sequences’, for short). But when we consider the use of these calls in various
contexts, it seems that snort-roar sequences have the broadest distribution.
This poses a dilemma: in the semantics, if concatenation is interpreted as
conjunction, snort-roar+ should be logically stronger than its component parts,
and thus it should have a narrower distribution than single snorts and pure
roar+ sequences. This is not what we find; in particular, snort-roar sequences
have a much broader distribution than individual snorts. Given the general
framework we have been adopting, this leaves three kinds of options open.
20 In Schel’s work, what we call here a ‘roar’ and transcribe as r was named a ‘roaring phrase’.
We avoid the latter term in this piece due to its unwanted syntactic implications.
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(i) One possibility is that the meaning of snort-roar sequences is not derived
from the meaning of their component parts. Either snort-roar sequences
should be taken as a different word from snort and roar – so that the issue
of compositionality does not arise; or the complex unit should be inter-
preted non-compositionally, just as was proposed for pyow-hack sequences
by Arnold and Zuberbühler. Given that there is no long pause between snort
and roar in these cases, the first option would make excellent sense.
(ii) A second possibility is to derive themeaning of snort-roar sequences from the
meaning of their component parts, but by a mechanism which is different
from conjunction. Such an analysis bears similarity to our initial analysis of
the -oo suffix of Campbell’s monkeys, which broadened the call meaning. For
lack of constraints on such a mechanism, we will not explore this possibility
further for the moment, although it might become a live option in the future.
(iii) A third option is to take the literal meaning of individual snorts and roars
to be extremely weak, but to be enriched by pragmatic rules. This might
allow us to preserve a mechanism of conjunctive combination for snort-
roar sequences, while explaining why on the surface the distribution of
individual snorts and roars is more constrained than that of snort-roar
sequences. As we will see, it is difficult to get such an analysis to work,
and in the end we will not have a good alternative to the treatment of
snort-roar sequences as non-compositional complex calls.
5.1 Colobus patterns
5.1.1 Data
Let us concentrate for the moment on Guereza Colobus monkeys. We have data
obtained in field experiments from two sites, Kaniyo Pabidi and Sonso. They
differ primarily in that leopards are present in Kaniyo Pabidi but not in Sonso.
However, this needn’t affect our discussions too much, for three reasons. First,
we have no evidence of a linguistic or behavioral difference between the two sites
(this might of course be because our data are not sufficiently rich, or because we
haven’t analyzed them properly). Second, Schel and Zuberbühler (2009) argued
that even in Sonso Colobus monkeys display an innate and appropriate reaction
to leopard stimuli: although the leopard naïve monkeys at Sonso showed slightly
more ‘exploration’ behavior (i. e. they approached the leopard stimuli more often
compared to the monkeys at Kaniyo Pabidi), both populations exhibited acous-
tically similar vocal anti-predator behavior in the presence of leopard stimuli–
which might dampen the effect of any cognitive difference across the two sites.
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Raw data for Kaniyo Pabidi are given in (49). Each box represents a discourse,
i. e. a sequence produced as a reaction to a stimulus. Within each box, each line
corresponds to a separate sentence, i. e. a sequence of calls separated by longer-than-
normal pauses. Snorts are represented as black dots, and roars as red + signs. As can
be seen, there are multiple series of roars, whereas snorts either appear singly, or at
the beginning of snort-roar sequences. This graph is reproduced in a larger format in
the Supplementary Materials (in (91)), together with entirely similar-looking Guereza
Colobus data from Sonso (in (92)) as well as King Colobus data (in (93)).
(49) Guereza data from Kaniyo Pabidi
eagle
shrieks
eagle
bwC
leopard
growls
leopard
bwC
leopard
fur
lion
growls
chimp
bwC
chimp
fur
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Calls
r
s
Guereza Colobus monkey data from Kaniyo Pabidi. In each case, each box represents the response
to one variant of a specific stimulus, as described at the top of the columns. The first line in the
column header represents the predator type (e.g., Eagle, Leopard) and the second line the way it
was induced, e.g., through a playback of its “shrieks” or “growls”, or through the playback of calls
from Diana monkeys or Black and White Colobus monkeys (bwC) as produced in response to such
a predator’s acoustic manifestation. For conciseness and legibility, no more than 10 groups
(or sentences) of calls are represented, and no more than 15 calls within each of these groups/
sentences are represented. Red + signs represent roars, black dots represent snorts.
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5.1.2 Syntax
We will start with some generalizations about the syntax. There are just three
types of sentences: individual snorts, snort-roar sequences, made of a single
snort and a series of roars; and sentences made of roars only. No clear patterns
emerge at the level of discourse syntax, except that when single snorts (i. e.
snorts that don’t appear in a snort-roar sentence) appear, they do so at the
beginning of discourses. The main generalizations are stated in (50), and can
be encoded by the rules in (51).
(50) Syntactic generalizations
a. Sentences are of three types: s, sr+, r+
b. In discourses, if individual snorts appear, they usually do at the
beginning.
(51) Syntax
We write _ for intersentential pause.
a. Sentential syntax: sentences are of three types, which we divide into
two categories:
S = s
S’= sr+, r+
b. Discourse syntax: discourses are of the form (S_)*(S’_)*, where * is the
Kleene star.
The sentential syntax is self-explanatory. The discourse syntax just encodes the
fact that if single snorts appear, they do so at the beginning of discourses.
As was the case in our other descriptions of monkey syntax, we remain
agnostic about the ultimate explanation of the syntactic restrictions we find. In
particular, it might be for articulatory reasons that snorts do not appear in series
without pauses, and only appear at the beginning of discourses – possibly
because they function like sneezes, which might require a fairly long recovery
phase before the same sound can be produced again. Importantly, however, in
snort-roar sentences, snorts are immediately followed by roars, possibly because
the latter are produced very differently and the recovery phase might for this
reason be much shorter. Since the acoustic coherence of snort-roar sentences
will matter in our discussions, we provide quantitative data in (52); the crucial
data point is in (52)b, where we see that when a snort is followed by a roar, the
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pause between them is on average extremely brief – which makes it plausible
that they could be analyzed as a single unit.21
(52) a. Average time from snort to snort: 14,072ms
b. Average time from snort to roar: 95ms
c. Average time from roar to snort: 3,085ms
d. Average time from roar to roar: 1,182ms
5.1.3 The semantic puzzle
Let us come to the semantics. The generalizations are not as sharp as one might
want, but they are nonetheless suggestive:
(53) Semantic generalizations
a. Individual snorts are only given to terrestrial animals, whether preda-
tors or not.
b. Snort-roar sequences appear in every context.
c. Sentences made of roars only appear primarily – but not exclusively –
in aerial predator contexts. They are strongly indicative of aerial pre-
dators if they appear at the beginning of discourses.
As mentioned at the outset, if concatenation is interpreted as conjunction,
snort-roar sentences should have a stronger meaning than individual snorts
and pure roar-sentences – and thus they should appear in a subset of the
environments in which snorts appear, and of those in which roars appear; this
is the opposite from what we find. We explore two main solutions: one is to
take snort-roar sentences to have a non-compositional meaning, just like pyow-
hack sequences in Arnold and Zuberbühler’s analysis; the other solution is
21 We note that this result is not altered by excluding transitions longer than a certain thresh-
old, to ensure that in all cases we are looking at transitions within a phrase. For instance,
restricting attention to intervals below 200ms gives the values in (i). Furthermore, as is expected
given our syntactic generalizations, when such a threshold is added, there are very few
transitions from roar to snort, as seen in (i)b.
(i) a. Average time from snort to snort: no such transition anymore
b. Average time from snort to roar: 76ms (116 cases)
c. Average time from roar to snort: 119ms (7 cases)
d. Average time from roar to roar: 121ms (331 cases)
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based on very weak meanings combined with rules of pragmatic strengthening.
In a nutshell, snort competes with snort-roar+ and is thus strengthened to:
snort and not (snort-)roar+; and by the same logic roar+ is strengthened to roar+
and not snort(-roar+). As a result, snort-roar+ is not stronger than the strength-
ened meanings snort and roar+, which might solve the dilemma we started out
with. But as we will see, the implementation of this general idea is unsatisfac-
tory at this point, although it could be improved in future research. (For
simplicity, we disregard the issue of sentence length and alarm parameters
in the present discussion, although these should presumably play in the end
the same kind of role as in our other monkey analyses.)
5.2 A complex call analysis of Colobus sequences
As mentioned before, it would have been simplest for Arnold and Zuberbühler to
treat pyow-hack sequences as being phonologically but not syntactically made of
pyows and hacks, as such an analysis would not even have raised the possibility
that their meanings were compositionally derived. But the non-stereotyped
character of pyow-hack sequences and, more importantly, the relatively long
pauses found between their component parts, made this analysis rather
implausible.
The situation is partly similar and partly different with Colobus snort-roar
sentences. On the one hand, they too come in different varieties, since the
number of roars present in snort-roar sentences is variable (although the snort
part is fixed). On the other hand, snort-roar sentences are produced almost
without pause between the various elements, which makes it rather more
plausible that they receive a meaning as wholes.
Taking a hint from our non-compositional treatment of pyow-hack
sequences in (39), we posit as a first approximation the lexical entries in (54).
(54) Lexicalist semantics (1st try)
(As before, r+ represents any non-empty string of roars.)
a. 〚sr+〛= 1 iff there is an alert.
b. 〚r+〛= 1 iff there is a serious (or: a non-ground) alert.
c. 〚s〛= 1 iff there is a serious ground alert.
The key here is that sr+ is, by brute force, given the weakest meaning – and it is
thus unsurprising that sr+ can appear in all contexts. An individual s is given
the plausible meaning of ground-related alerts (we wouldn’t want to say that
they are ground predator-related, since numerous single snorts are found in
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(moving) cow-related contexts [see (92)]. Importantly, r+ could be given the
meaning of non-ground or of serious alert. The distinction is not easy to draw
since non-ground predators are probably the most dangerous predators as well.
Importantly, we should not posit that r+ is reserved for aerial predators, as we
find quite a few r+ in chimpanzee-related contexts; but since chimpanzees are
presumably both dangerous and (often) non-ground predators, this fact alone
does not suffice to decide between the two choices.
As was the case in our earlier discussions, we must still explain why in most
cases we find specific rather than non-specific calls at the beginning of predator-
related discourses; for instance, few leopard-related and eagle-related dis-
courses start with sr+ rather than s or r+. These patterns can be captured when
two assumptions are made.
(i) First, s, r+ and sr+ (viewed as complete propositional elements) compete with
each other. While it’s not clear that there should be an entailment relation
between s and r+ (in our initial analysis, there isn’t), sr+ should come out as
the least informative of the competitors, as represented in (55). The Informativity
Principle in (12) will thus predict that sr+ can only occur when s and r+ are
inapplicable.
(55) Informativity scale according to (54)
sr+
s
r+
(ii) If we stopped here, we would predict that, whenever the Informativity
Principle is applied, sr+ fails to occur in predator-related situations. This seems
too strong. But we can once again make use of our assumption about Alarm
Decay in (41): both s and r+ are presumably specified for serious alerts, and
consequently when the alert becomes less serious, only the default call sr+ can
be used.
Note that we might refine our analysis a bit by positing that s is more
informative than r+. If so, it would be by competition with s that r+ gets its
‘non-ground predator’ meaning, as is represented in (56)-(57).
(56) Lexicalist semantics (2nd try)
a. 〚sr+〛= 1 iff there is an alert.
b. 〚r+〛= 1 iff there is a serious alert.
c. 〚s〛= 1 iff there is a serious alert and it is a ground alert.
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(57) Informativity scale according to (56)
sr+
s
r+
Our analysis could make a more subtle prediction: since individual snorts
only appear at the beginning of discourses, one would expect that it is only in
such positions that r+ has a non-ground meaning – which would account for the
observation, mentioned in (53)c, that roars are strongly indicative of aerial
predators if they appear at the beginning of discourses. We can achieve this
result with the definition in (58), which specifies that a sentence S1 competes
with a sentence S2 only in the case the latter could replace S1 in the discourse in
which S1 appears.
(58) Alternatives
For any sentences S1 and S2 (defined by (51)a), if S1 appears in a discourse
D of the form D=AS1B.(defined by (51)b, for any strings A and B), then S2 is
an alternative to S1 just in case AS2B is a well-formed discourse.
When combined with the Informativity Principle in (12), this restrictive definition
of alternatives will have the effect that r+ will be potentially enriched to a ‘non-
ground alert’ meaning only if (i) it appears at the very beginning of a discourse,
or (ii) it is preceded by single snorts – since it is only in these two cases that
replacing r+ with s will yield a well-formed discourse. In case (ii), enrichment to
not s will yield a contradiction and thus will not be applicable (this is thus
another case in which it matters greatly that pragmatic enrichment is an
optional operation). By contrast, some instances of case (i) should yield the
desired enrichment to a ‘non-ground predator’ meaning.
5.3 A compositional alternative?
We now briefly explore a compositional alternative to the complex call theory.
As will be recalled, our initial problem was that on a conjunctive compositional
treatment, sr+ should be logically stronger than its individual component parts s
and r+ . But from a purely semantic perspective (i. e. without rules of pragmatic
enrichment), it is then unexpected that sr+ should serve as a general alert call,
whereas s and r+ have a more limited distribution. The solution we will explore
is in two steps.
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(i) First, we posit that s and r have extremely weak meanings – so much so
that even their conjunction could be expected to occur in almost every
environment. Specifically, we will posit that s is applicable just in case
there is a possibility that there is a ground alert, and r just in case there is a
possibility that there is a non-ground alert.22
(ii) Second, we will posit a mechanism of pragmatic competition in which
sentences of the form s and r+ compete with sr+ sentences. Since concate-
nation is interpreted as conjunction, sr+ is more informative than s and also
more informative than r+. By the Informativity Principle, s yields the infer-
ence that not sr+, hence (given that s is asserted) not r+; and by parity of
reasoning, r+ yields the inference that not sr+, hence (given that r+ is
asserted) not s. On the assumption that calls are usually produced because
the caller has information about a ground or a non-ground threat, s will
end up being used (on its strengthened meaning) just in case the caller
believes that there is a ground threat while r will be used in case the caller
believes that there is a non-ground threat. On the assumption that the
required theory of mind is available (a non-trivial assumption in this case),
hearers would then adjust their beliefs to take into account those of the
speaker, hence the fact that they display appropriate reactions, looking up
more often than down when they hear r+, and conversely when they hear r.
Let us see in greater detail how the analysis can be developed. We posit the
same syntax as before, but s and r will now be treated as words in all their
occurrences, including in sr+ (whereas before they were just treated as pho-
nemes in the latter); their lexical meanings are given in (59).
(59) Word meanings
a. 〚r〛= 1 iff there is a possibility of a non-ground alarm.
b. 〚s〛= 1 iff there is a possibility of a ground alarm.
Once we have these word meanings, they can be assembled into sentences and
interpreted conjunctively, as stated in (60).
(60) Sentence meanings
Concatenation is interpreted as conjunction.
22 A potential argument in favor of this weakening is that s and r both appear in morning
choruses, where their informational content is presumably very weak or non-existent.
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We continue to apply the Informativity Principle in (12), and for simplicity we
take it to apply to the alternatives in (61), with the informativity relations in (62)
(the definition of alternatives would have to be significantly refined if sentence
length were taken into account).
(61) Alternatives
s, sr + and r+ are alternatives to each other.
(62) Informativity scale according to (59)-(60).
sr+
s r+
When we combine the literal meanings with the enrichment obtained through
the Informativity Principle, we obtain the strengthened meanings in (63), with the
convention (already used for Campbell’s calls) that〚r〛and〚s〛(with underlined
letters) refer to the strengthened meanings of r and s respectively, obtained by
adding to the literal meanings 〚r〛and〚s〛the inferences that are triggered by
the Informativity Principle.23
(63) Strengthened meanings
a. 〚s〛= 1 iff there is a possibility of a ground alarm but no possibility of
a non-ground alarm.
b. 〚r+〛= 1 iff there is a possibility of a non-ground alarm but no possi-
bility of a ground alarm.
c. 〚sr+〛= 1 iff there is a possibility of a ground alarm and there is a
possibility of a non-ground alarm.
23 The desired results could also be obtained with the sole alternatives fs, r+g if the
Informativity Principle worked by negating the non-weaker meanings rather than just the
stronger ones. On this view, s would trigger the inference that not r+ and r + would trigger
the inference that not s. This modified version of the Informativity Principle is in fact used in
much recent work on implicatures in human languages (see Schlenker to appear for a recent
survey). But the problems mentioned in Section 5.4.1 would still arise; one would need to take
into account information about entire discourses to circumvent these difficulties.
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In this way, we derive the result that s is almost only used for ground threats
and r+ is almost only used for non-ground threats (we add ‘almost’ because
pragmatic strengthening need not apply in all cases).
While various refinements could be envisaged, we will now explain why we
take this theoretical direction to be somewhat unsatisfactory anyway.
5.4 Assessment and perspectives
5.4.1 Assessment
Although our compositional analysis succeeds in deriving a general meaning for
sr+, it has flaws. The heart of the matter is that despite initial appearances the
meaning we predict for sr+ is not that of a general alert call. Rather, sr+ comes
with the positive entailment that there is a possibility of a ground threat and
there is a possibility of a non-ground threat. Consider for instance one of the
many discourses for the form (s_)+ (sr+_)+, in which a series of individual snorts
separated by pauses is followed by a series of snort-roar sentences separated by
pauses as well. The pragmatic meaning obtained in (63)a for snorts yields an
inference that there couldn’t be a non-ground threat. But this is directly contra-
dicted by the meaning of sr+ obtained in (63)c (pragmatic enrichment didn’t
matter there because sr+ was already the most informative sentence among the
set of competitors). Undesirable contradictions already arose in our pragmatic
analysis of Campbell’s monkey semantics in Section 3.3.2. As will be recalled, we
had analyzed krak-oo as contributing the information that there is a weak alarm;
but then we were hard pressed to explain why krak-oo can co-occur with hok,
which is indicative of eagles – a serious threat. Our solution was to relativize the
contribution of a call to the caller’s state at the precise time at which the call is
uttered. Thus we could imagine that a hok could be followed by a krak-oo if the
caller had become less alarmed than it initially was when uttering hok. We could
adopt a similar line of explanation with Colobus calls, but this would have
unwelcome consequences; for in our analysis it is not the seriousness of the
alarm that would need to be re-assessed in the course of the utterance of a
discourse, but the nature of the alarm. And we cannot think of a natural reason
why a snort, indicative (on its strengthened meaning) of the possibility of a
ground threat and the impossibility of a non-ground threat, might after a while
be followed by a snort-roar sentence that positively entails the possibility of a
non-ground threat.
Pending further investigation, we take the compositional analysis to be
somewhat unsatisfactory, which could lend credence to the non-compositional
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analysis. This is of course a conclusion out of lack of imagination, hence a weak
one; but it is at least compatible with the acoustic data, which suggest that sr+
sequences might really form a phonological unit, as shown in (52)b. We believe,
however, that more detailed data and further theoretical investigations might
well cast doubt on this conclusion.
5.4.2 Comparison with King Colobus data
One remark is worth adding concerning Colobus phylogeny. Strikingly, King
Colobus monkeys have calls that are very similar to those of Guerezas, despite
the fact that in one recent estimate (see Ting 2008; Grubb et al. 2003), Guereza
Colobus monkeys and King Colobus monkeys separated approximately 1.6 mil-
lion years ago (see Schel et al. 2009 for a brief comparison of their acoustic
properties). Furthermore, in the limited dataset we have, their uses are rather
similar as well – although the generalizations we find in King Colobus calls are
less clear and might be more subject to noise than in Guerezas. Specifically, sr+
sentences appear in all environments, while individual snorts only appear at the
beginning of discourses and are usually (but not invariably) indicative of ground
threats; while r+ sentences are usually (but not invariably) associated with non-
ground threats, especially when they appear in initial positions. Data can be
found in (93) in the Supplementary Materials, in the same format as the Guereza
data from Kaniyo Pabidi (in (91)) and from Sonso (in (92)).
These similarities highlight the preservation of call form and function over
long periods of times – an issue we come back to in Section 7. It is also to be
hoped that more fined-grained data in the future will make it possible to study
differences among the calls of these two species.
6 Titi monkeys: semantics or cognition?
The previous discussions highlighted the importance of the division of labor
between syntax, semantics and pragmatics. For Campbell’s monkey calls, one
theory posited a dialectal difference in the lexical semantics, while another
theory posited a unified meaning selectively enriched by the Informativity
Principle. For Putty-nosed monkey calls, one theory postulated that pyow-hack
sequences are interpreted as whole units, whereas the other theory interpreted
them call-by-call – but crucially relied on the Informativity Principle and on the
Urgency Principle to yield further inferences. We now turn to the case of Titi
monkey sequences, which will highlight the importance of the division of labor
52 Philippe Schlenker et al.
 - 10.1515/tl-2016-0001
Downloaded from PubFactory at 08/03/2016 05:33:58PM
via University of St Andrews Scotland
between semantics/pragmatics and properties of the environmental context (we
only summarize the main argument, which is laid out in much greater detail in
Schlenker et al., to appear).
We start from Cäsar et al. (2013), who showed in striking field experiments
that Titi monkeys can encode information about both predator type and predator
location, using just two calls (A and B) rearranged in complex ways. While this
might initially appear to argue for a complex syntax/semantics mapping, we
argue instead for a very simple semantic analysis, crucially complemented by
non-trivial assumptions about the environmental context. Specifically, we first
show that the simplest behavioral assumptions make it challenging to provide
lexical specifications for A- and B-calls: B-calls rather clearly have the distribu-
tion of general alert calls; but A-calls are also found in highly heterogeneous
contexts (e. g. they are triggered by ‘cat in the canopy’ and ‘raptor on the
ground’ situations). We discuss two possible solutions to the problem. The
first analysis posits that entire sequences are endowed with meanings that are
not compositionally derived from the individual calls they contain. The second
analysis combines a very simple compositional analysis with some more sophis-
ticated assumptions about predator behavior and context change.
6.1 Titi sequences
In Cäsar et al.’s field experiments, the two factors predator= {cat; raptor} and
location= {on the ground; in the canopy} gave rise to four types of sequences
obtained with just two calls, the A-call and the B-call, as represented in slightly
simplified form in (64). (Notation: if X is any call, X+ represents a series of at
least one X-call, and X++ a series of at least two X-calls. We write X+ and X++ for
series that display these patterns with up to 3 extraneous calls interspersed.)
(64) Model predator experiments
a. Raptor in the canopy: A++ (4/5 sequences; the 5th contains inter-
spersed O-calls; average length of the 5
sequences = 26.8 calls)
b. Raptor on the ground: A++B++ (5/7 sequences; 2/7 have the form A+)
c. Cat in the canopy: A B++ (4/6 sequences; 1/6 has the form X A B++
with an unidentified call X)
d. Cat on the ground: B++ (5/5 sequences)
In addition, Cäsar collected naturalistic data, which provide further useful
information and are summarized in simplified form in (65).
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(65) Naturalistic observations
a. Flying raptor: A+ (19/20 sequences; average length
of the 20 sequences = 2.2 calls)
b. Calling or perched raptor: A++ (9/9; average length of the 9
sequences = 15.8 calls)
c. Capuchin in tree: Diverse: A++, A++ B++ A++, etc with C-
calls interspersed
d. Non-animal-related
(foraging/descending/feeding):
B++ (13/16)
Simple inspection shows that the stereotyped call sequences in (64) encode
information about both predator threat and predator location. Despite initial
appearances, we will argue that this does not argue for a complex syntax/
semantics interface; rather, the generalizations in (64) and (65) are compatible
with an analysis in which each call has a simple meaning that pertains to the
precise moment at which it is uttered; and the complexity of the call sequences
is due at least as much to properties of the environment (and the fact that the
context changes as calls are uttered) as to the Titi linguistic system per se.
6.2 Initial problems
The Titi generalizations in (64) and (65) pose a challenge for a semantic analysis
based on simplistic assumptions about the environment. In a nutshell, the
problem is that the B-call occurs in environments that are so diverse that it
seems to be a general alert call, with a very weak lexical specification. But it
turns out that within predator contexts the A-call also occurs in environments
that do not seem to form a natural class, and hence that it seems to function as a
general predator alarm call. But if this is so, within predator contexts the
difference between A-calls and B-calls becomes hard to analyze.
It is immediate that the lexical contribution of B-calls must be extremely weak,
since they appear both in non-predation-related ((65)d) and in predation-related
situations ((64)b, c, d; (65)c); furthermore, within predation contexts they occur
both in eagle- ((64)b) and in cat-related situations ((64)c,d), and in situations in
which the threat is on the ground ((64)b,d) as well as in the canopy ((64)c).
In addition, Cäsar et al. (2012b) note that B-calls were produced “sometimes in
the absence of external events, especially when monkeys were descending or
foraging close to the ground, when an observer was blocking their intended path,
during inter-group encounters and, for unhabituated groups, in response to
humans”. This suggests the lexical entry in (66).
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(66) B-call
B is applicable if and only if there is a noteworthy event.
But A-calls also occur in heterogeneous environments. While in our data A-calls
are not used in non-predatory situations, within predator-related situations they
occur both in ‘raptor on the ground’ situations ((64)b) and in ‘cat in the canopy’
situations ((64)c). It is hard to see what these two situations could have in
common besides being situations of predation. So it would seem reasonable to
posit the lexical entry in (67):
(67) A-call (initial attempt)
A is applicable if and only if there is a predator-related alert.
Although A- and B-calls have different lexical specifications according to the
rules in (66) and (67), within predator contexts it is unclear what could distin-
guish them. We could of course make use of the Informativity Principle in (12),
for instance at the level of individual calls – using our previous terminology, this
would treat each call as a sentence, with the assumption that A and B are
alternatives to each other, as stated in (68). But this makes incorrect predictions:
the B-call is now predicted not to arise in predator-related environments.
(68) Alternatives
Each individual A- and B-call is a sentence, and they are alternatives to
each other.
(69) Prediction of (68) given (66)-(67) and (12)
When pragmatic strengthening is applied, the B-call should only be applic-
able when there is a non-predator related alert (since in predator-related
alerts the A-call is more informative).
The heart of the matter is that while the A-call is more informative than the B-
call, its lexical specification is still very weak. And since the Informativity
Principle in (12) has the effect of enriching the meaning of B with the negation
of A, the result is an enriched meaning for B which is just too strong.
We believe there are two natural directions to explore to solve the problem
we just laid out. One is to posit that the meaning of an entire sequence is not
compositionally derived from the meaning of the individual calls it contains, but
rather is obtained ‘holistically’. As an alternative, we will posit that the meaning
of a sequence is compositionally derived, but we will make more sophisticated
assumptions about predator hunting strategies and context change.
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6.3 A non-compositional theory
Just as we did in our non-compositional analysis of pyow-hack sequences, we
will now assign meanings to whole sentences. Since we do not have information
on the role played by sequence length, we omit the alarm parameter from the
present analysis (it would be easy to add one if necessary). We posit the syntax
in (70) and make use of the Informativity Principle to posit relatively simple
meanings, as in (71), with the natural definition of alternatives in (72). As in
our statement of the generalizations in (64)-(65), we write X++ to abbreviate XX+
( = the set of strings made of at least two X’s (and only X’s)). Note that the
sentences we posit mirror those found in model predator experiments in (64), but
also (in simplified form) those obtained from observational data in (65) – with the
exception of the (chaotic) Capuchin sequences, to which we return below.
(70) Syntax
B++, A++, A++ B++, AB++
(71) Non-compositional Titi meanings
If S is a complete call sequence, then
a. if S of the form B++, 〚S〛= 1 iff there is a noteworthy event.
b. if S of the form A++, 〚S〛= 1 iff there is a non-ground predator.
c. if S of the form A++B++,〚S〛= 1 iff there is a non-ground predator on the
ground.
d. if S of the form AB++, 〚S〛= 1 iff there is a ground predator in a non-
ground position.
(72) Alternatives
The alternatives to a Titi sentence S are all the sentences obtained by
replacing, call for call, any number of A’s with (the same number of) B’s
and any number of B’s with (the same number of) A’s.
(71) gives rise to the relations of informativity in (73); combined with the
Informativity Principle in (12) (and the definition of alternatives in (72)), this
gives rise to the strengthened meanings in (74); as in our earlier discussions, we
write as〚S〛the strengthened meaning of a sentence S (whose literal meaning
is just〚S〛).24
24 Note that due to the definition of alternatives in (72), only sequences that have the same
number of calls can be alternatives to each other. Thus a sequence of the form A++ need not be
an alternative to a sentence of the form B++ , although the relations of informativity in (74) will
still hold. See Schlenker et al. (to appear) for more details.
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(73) Informativity relations among Titi sentences
according to (70) (higher = strictly more informative)
++
A++
A++B++
AB++
B
(74) Strengthened Titi meanings
If s is a complete call sequence, then
a. if S is of the form B++,〚S〛= 1 iff there is an alert but no non-ground
predator.
b. if S is of the form A++,〚S〛= 1 iff there is a non-ground predator in the
canopy.
c. if S is of the form A++B++,〚S〛= 1 iff there is a non-ground predator on
the ground.
d. if S is of the form AB++,〚S〛= 1 iff there is a ground predator in a non-
ground position.
Still, this theory has several flaws. First, it is not explanatory: it just stipulates in
slightly improved form (thanks to the Informativity Principle) the generalizations it
was supposed to derive. Second, the time course of Titi sequences also makes it
unlikely that these are treated as whole units. As discussed in Schlenker et al. to
appear, the average inter-call interval is of 1.4s. In ‘raptor on the ground’ situations,
whenB-calls areproduced, the first B-call appears onaverage after the 12thposition in
the sequence (average position: 12.6); very roughly, this gives an averagewaiting time
of 16-17s or so before one hears the first B-call after the first call is produced – hence
Titiswould sometimes have towait for something like 16s to tellwhether the sequence
they are hearing is of the form A++ or A++B++. Finally, Cäsar et al. (2012b) notes that
after hearing anA-call the Titimonkeys look upwards. Presumably this also applies to
the A++B++ sequences, which according to (71)c provide information about non-
ground predators on the ground (see Schlenker et al. to appear for details). But this
suggests that what is crucial about A-calls is not so much their raptor-related content
as the information they provide about a non-ground threat.
6.4 A compositional theory based on more sophisticated
environmental assumptions
We will now circumvent these problems by assuming (i) that the A-call does not
provide information about the nature of the predator and its location, but rather
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about the appropriate reactions to the relevant threat, and (ii) that the composi-
tion of sequences in part reflects the way in which the environment changes as a
sentence is uttered. Specifically, we will assume that the A-call is specified for
serious non-ground alerts, and that the reason we find an initial A++ sequence in
‘raptor on the ground’ situation is that raptors attack by flying, and thus that
even when a raptor is on the ground the threat isn’t a ground one. As for the fact
that B++ sequences can follow A++ sequences, this will be taken to reflect a drop
in threat level after the appearance of an initial trigger, with the result that the
‘serious non-ground alert’ content of the A-call stops being applicable, leaving B
as the only contender.
To develop the analysis in greater detail, we will need three assumptions
that have some independent motivation (see Schlenker et al., to appear for
details and references).
(75) a. A raptor hunts by being perched or by flying; a raptor on the ground is
not in a hunting position.
b. Cats become less dangerous once they have been detected (they hunt
by ambush rather than pursuit).
c. Capuchins are dangerous even if they have been detected (they are
pursuit hunters).
Our semantics is now extremely simple: each call contributes a simple meaning
to a sequence; when several calls are present, they are composed conjunctively.
Importantly, however, we take into account the fact that call rates are relatively
slow, and relativize the truth conditions of calls to different times. In effect, this
means that each call is treated as a separate utterance. As a result, call repetition
is not semantically vacuous: each token makes a new claim, namely that the
relevant alarm holds at the time of utterance of that token. If we wish to compute
the overall semantic effect of a sequence, we must conjunctively combine the
calls while adapting the value of the time parameter with each call.
(76) Semantics of Titi discourses (partial: A- and B-calls only)
For any time t,
a. 〚B〛t = 1 iff there is a noteworthy event at t.
b. 〚A〛t = 1 iff there is a serious non-ground alert at t.
c. If w is a call and S is a sequence of calls,
〚wS〛t = 1 iff 〚w〛t =〚S〛t+1 = 1.
(76)a is just the statement that B has a highly underspecified semantics. (76)b
encodes the treatment of A as a serious non-ground alert call. And (76)c specifies
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that calls are combined in a conjunctive way, and that calls that follow each
other are evaluated at different times. An example is given in (77).
(77) 〚AB〛0 = 1 iff 〚A〛0 =〚B〛1 = 1, iff there is a serious non-ground alert at
time 0 and there is a noteworthy event at time 1.
Unsurprisingly, the distribution of the B-call should be constrained by appealing to
the Informativity Principle, combined with the assumption that calls individually
compete with each other, as is already stated in (68). (As in our initial discussion
in Section 6.2, we take single calls to be complete utterances, with the result that
the Informativity Principle enriches meanings on a call-by-call basis.)
(78) Consequence of (12) and (68)
If B is uttered at time t, one can infer that at time t (i) there is a noteworthy event,
but not (ii) a serious non-ground alert (or else theA-call would have beenused).
Let us now see how our hypotheses can derive the patterns we observe. We start
with the data in (64)-(65), repeated in condensed form in (79).
(79) Simplified Generalizations
a. Raptor b. Cat c. Capuchin d. Non-predator related
Experimental Canopy (i) A++
(mean = 26.8 calls)
(i) AB++
Ground (ii) A++B++ (ii) B++
Naturalistic (iii) Flying: A+
(mean = 2.2 calls)
(iv) Calling or perched:
A++ (mean = 15.8 calls)
In tree:
A++, A++B++A++, etc
deer, foraging/
descending B++
Raptor situations: The generalizations (79)a(i), (ii) and (iv) are unsurprising in
view of our hypotheses about eagle hunting techniques in (75)a. First, a model
raptor in the canopy or a perched raptor present serious non-ground threats, and the
threats should be taken to persist in time since these are typical hunting positions –
hence the fact that the sequences are long. Second, sequences of A-calls are shorter
in the naturalistic ‘flying raptor’ situations in (79)a(iii) (Mean number ofAs: 2.2) than
in the naturalistic ‘calling/perched raptor’ (M= 15.8 As, W= 13, p= .00021)25 situa-
tions in (79)a(iv) or in the experimental ‘raptor in canopy’ situations in (79)a(i)
25 We used Mann-Whitney tests using each call as an independent data point. The structure of
the data forces us to merge all groups into one for these analyses, rather than studying a
possible group effect (there is no group for which there is more than three calls for two of the
situations). But we have no reason to believe that there exists such a group effect.
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(M= 26.8,W=0, p= .00048); this is presumably because a raptor that flies away is a
briefer threat than immobile raptors in typical hunting position (it might also be that
in experimental situations the model raptor remains perched longer than in natur-
alistic ones, although it might become clear at some point that it is not a normal
living raptor). Finally, the pattern in (79)b(ii) is expected if we remember that a
raptor on the ground will attack (if it does) by flying, as stated in (75)a. Therefore the
initial A++ we find is unsurprising and provides the most urgent message first, as a
danger may be coming from above.
Since immobility on the ground is not a typical hunting position, it is also
unsurprising that after a while the threat stops being considered as serious –
presumably because a raptor would not normally remain motionless on the ground
for long periods of time. Asmentioned above, the first B-call in ‘raptor on the ground’
situations occurs on average in position 12.6 in the sequence – with a possible
estimate of 16–17s after the first call. This might give the caller enough time to
decide that the threat isn’t too serious any more; if so, it is because the A-call is
specified for serious non-ground threats that it stops being applicable after that time,
with the result that B-calls start being used instead. By the logic of pragmatic
competition, this is the only case in which we see B-calls for raptor-related threats.
Cat situations: In ‘cat on the ground’ situations, only the B-call can be used,
hence the B-sequences in (79)b(ii). The production of an A-call (specified for a
‘serious non-ground alert’) at the beginning of ‘cat in the canopy’ situations
should give us pause. Given our assumptions, it can be explained:
– When a cat is detected in the canopy, it represents a serious non-ground
threat, hence the production of an A-call.
– As a consequence of this A-call, it can be assumed that the cat has been
detected by conspecifics.26 As a result, the threat level diminishes, in accor-
dance with (75)b. Because the A-call is specified for serious non-ground threats,
it can’t be used any more, with the result that only the B-call can be used.
Capuchin situations: Naturalistic capuchin situations give rise to a diversity of
calling sequences, some of them with quite a few A-calls. This is strikingly
different from the stereotyped AB++ sequences we found in ‘cat in the canopy’
model experiments. It is thus notable that two mammal predators in non-ground
situations give rise to such different calling behaviors. Now one source of the
difference might be that real capuchins move in ways that model cats don’t. But
an additional explanation might lie in the difference between leopard and
26 See Schlenker et al. (to appear) for a discussion of the cognitive implications of this reasoning,
and for further data.
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capuchin hunting strategies outlined in (75)b,c: capuchins continue to be dan-
gerous even after they have been detected, hence we have no reason to expect
the AB++ pattern we found in ‘cat in the canopy’ situations. While this doesn’t
explain the details of the complex patterns we find in capuchin situations, it
does give us a way to address an initially surprising difference.
Non-predatory situations: It is clear that in situations that do not involve
serious threats the A-call cannot be used, hence the fact that we only find B-
calls in these cases.
6.5 Conclusions
With our initial hypothesis that calls directly convey information about predator
type and/or predator location, we were not able to provide a coherent meaning for
A- and B-calls, and we had to resort to a somewhat unappealing theory in which
entire sequences had a non-compositional meaning. Arguably, a better and sim-
pler theory can be obtained if we make use of more sophisticated assumptions
about context change and the environment. Two proved particularly crucial: first,
we assumed that a raptor on the ground still signals the presence of a non-ground
threat; second, we assumed that the meaning of calls is relativized to the precise
time at which they are uttered, with the result that the composition of a sequence
sometimes reflects the way in which the cognitive situation changes as the
sequence is uttered. It should be added that besides semantics and the environ-
mental context, pragmatic competition among calls played an important role in
our explorations, since this mechanism was crucial to explain why B-calls are not
found in all situations. Thus, as was the case in our earlier explorations, the
division of labor between syntax, semantics, pragmatics and properties of environ-
mental context is essential to understand Titi sequences; but in this case assump-
tions about context change and the environment proved particularly crucial.
7 Evolutionary monkey linguistics
The previous sections have considered the calls of various species as indepen-
dent systems. But it is also important to consider that a species’ calls are parts of
a suite of related, genetically constrained characters. Across monkey species,
vocal signals generally appear to be fixed traits, especially in terms of acoustic
structure and production (Seyfarth and Cheney 1997). Vocal repertoires, there-
fore, reflect the evolutionary histories of species and should, in principle, exhibit
predictable patterns across taxa. As discussed in Section 5.4.2, Guereza and King
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Colobus monkeys diverged approximately 1.6 million years ago (see Ting 2008;
Grubb et al. 2003), yet appear to display essentially the same calls, with what
currently seem to be minor phonetic differences, and no clear differences in use.
It is remarkable that, in some cases at least, the form and function of calls seem
to be preserved over rather long periods.27
In this section, we suggest that a comparative approach to the calls of
different monkey species could lay the groundwork for an evolutionary monkey
linguistics.
– First, by integrating phylogenetic information about different monkey spe-
cies with a comparison of their call systems, we offer methods for investi-
gating patterns and processes related to repertoire development over
millions of years.
– Second, this study would add some empirical depth to our formal theories.
One key limitation of our enterprise is that the data are hard to get and leave
theories very much underspecified. We could constrain them further by
developing parametrized theories that seek to account for similarities and
differences among call systems, as well as call evolution.
– Finally, when similar call systems are found in very distant species, they could
help specify the forces that might have led to convergent evolution. We men-
tioned before (in Section 3.4) Wheeler and Fischer’s (2012) observation that
across species it tends to be the call associated with terrestrial predators that is
given in other contexts, whereas the call associated with aerial predators tends
to be more specific. They cite examples from New World monkeys as well as
lemurs. Given the date of separation between these species, it is unlikely that
common descent is responsible for these similarities, and it is more likely that
we are dealing with a case of convergent evolution – hence an interesting
question for the future: why do there seem to be more specific calls for aerial
predators than for ground predators? We trust that many other similar ques-
tions will arise when a comparative approach is adopted.
7.1 Comparative methods
At least two main approaches could help investigate the evolutionary history of
monkey languages. First, one could compare whole repertoires of related species
and, using principles of phylogenetic analysis, test whether similarities in calls’
acoustic structure and usage are better explained by convergent evolution or by
27 By contrast, we did discuss instances of variation among groups of Campbell’s monkeys, but
these raised the same general issues as dialectal or cross-linguistic variation in human lan-
guages, where differences are unlikely to have a biological/genetic explanation.
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common descent. This enterprise could build on rich data on call comparison
originally gathered to help reconstruct phylogenetic trees, as we will see shortly.
Second, one could draw inferences about repertoire evolution using a method of
internal reconstruction proposed by Fuller (2013). The main idea is that stereo-
typed calls of a species’ repertoire emerged from ancestral call types through
repeated processes of fission and modification. Fuller further posits that in such
cases the daughter calls are used in situations that are a subset of those in which
the ancestral call was used – in effect, he posits that the division of a call on the
phonological side corresponds with a division of semantic labor between the
daughter calls. If this idea is on the right track, we can to some extent recon-
struct the evolutionary history of a repertoire by considering its internal acoustic
and possibly semantic structure. While this method has been applied only to
Blue monkey calls, it could yield a powerful tool if combined with cross-linguis-
tic comparisons: one would expect the results of both enterprises to converge.
We now turn to a brief discussion of each method.
7.1.1 Cross-species comparisons
Phylogenetic reconstructions have long relied on comparison of phenotypic
characters (e. g. cranial morphology, dental patterns) among species, though
the utility of behavioral elements in systematics remains debated. Some
researchers have explicitly argued that calls are well-preserved aspects of the
phenotype, making them appropriate for reconstructing phylogenetic trees (e. g.
Cap et al. 2008; Gautier 1988). Evidence that the acoustic structures of many
primates’ calls are largely genetically determined (Newman and Symmes, 1982;
Seyfarth and Cheney 1997) supports this argument. It is also notable that trees
derived using DNA sequences only are similar to those obtained using vocal
signals. For example, trees for cercopithecines recently derived using the most
up-to-date DNA sequencing data (Guschanski et al., 2013) are remarkably similar
to one proposed by Gautier (1988) that included vocal signals along with other
phenotypic and genotypic characters. An illustrative example is displayed in
(80), where we have put side-by-side part of the phylogenetic tree recently
obtained on the basis of DNA data by Guschanski et al., and the tree recon-
structed by Gautier (1988) using acoustic similarity among calls.28
28 Note that Gautier had access to other data as well, including DNA ones; hence one cannot
assert that he predicted on the basis of call comparison a phylogenetic tree that was only
obtained later; rather, Gautier showed that there is a reasonable way to set up a similarity
measure among calls that dovetails nicely with DNA data, and this similarity measure might in
some cases help decide among competing phylogenies.
Formal monkey linguistics 63
 - 10.1515/tl-2016-0001
Downloaded from PubFactory at 08/03/2016 05:33:58PM
via University of St Andrews Scotland
(80) Guschanski et al. 2013 vs. Gautier 1988
Simplified phylogenetic trees for the Cercopithecini tribe derived using
mitochondrial DNA sequence data (right; Guschanski et al. 2013) compared
to one that included vocal signals as well as genetic and morphological
characters (left; Gautier 1988). Note that the superspecies C. mona includes
Campbell’s monkeys (which appear as * in the two trees).
Phylogenetic reconstructions today rely on DNA sequencing results more than
phenotypic characters, and for this reason systematic call comparison seems to
have partly fallen into oblivion.We believe that it should be revisited from a different
perspective. Instead of using call data to reconstruct phylogenies (e. g. Gautier 1988;
Gautier et al. 2002), well-resolved phylogenies might be used to reconstruct the
evolutionary history of repertoires and individual calls. The model proposed here
builds on the hypothesis that species’ vocal repertoires are inherited from ancestral
species, and that interspecific differences in repertoires reflect changes that occurred
after speciation. The method could involve the following components.
(i) First and foremost, comparisons must use well-resolved phylogenies and
complete repertoires. Though questions remain, research in these areas
continues to improve the availability of both. Where phylogenetic and call
data are adequate, it will be most useful to examine the most closely
related congeners (i. e. sister taxa) first, and then expand in a stepwise
fashion across taxa.
(ii) One should then identify potentially homologous call types among related
species – for instance by way of a cluster analysis using acoustic mea-
sures of call samples pooled from different species. The results could then
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be used to construct hypothetical “call trees” from which to infer shared
call types among species.
(ii) One could then determine similarities in the uses (syntax, semantics and
possibly pragmatics) of these calls. Although the form of a call might have
been preserved while the uses changed or conversely, the correspondence
will be established more strongly if it involves both form and function.
Nothing in the logic of this enterprise would prevent one from starting from
calls that are semantically similar without thereby being acoustically simi-
lar. But establishing semantic similarity is far more difficult than establish-
ing acoustic similarity, and for this reason it seems advisable to start from
the acoustic side and add semantic considerations when possible. In addi-
tion, in the absence of common descent there might be powerful socio-
ecological similarities that explain why some very distantly related species
have signals with the same semantics (‘function’) – e. g. many birds,
rodents, and primates have calls associated with snakes, and it is unlikely
that all of these calls were derived from a single common ancestor.
(iv) Finally, one should explore at least four hypotheses to account for the
similarities: (a) they might be a simple accident; (b) theymight be the product
of convergent evolution; (c) they might be explained by common descent;
and/or (d) they might be the product of co-evolution of several species (note
that sympatric associations are common and could lead to mutual influences
in calling behavior). In case (c), one may start to reconstruct the evolutionary
history of the relevant part of the language by using the dates of divergence
across species to postulate ancestral forms of (part of) a monkey language.
7.1.2 Fuller’s method of internal reconstruction
Fuller (2013) proposes that repertoires evolve by repeated fission of ancestral calls,
and that two things typically happen when fission takes place: (i) the daughter
calls share some acoustic properties with each other because they are variations on
the same ancestral call; (ii) the situations in which the new calls can be used are
subsets of the situations in which the ancestral call could be used; in other words,
the meanings of the new calls are refinements of the meaning of the ancestral call.
Concretely, Fuller applies clustering algorithms to the acoustics of calls,
and takes the resulting tree to reflect their evolutionary history: if call CA and
CB are part of a sub-tree that excludes CC, then Fuller posits that CA and CB
resulted from the fission of an ancestral call CAB which did not give rise to CC.
He then posits that the situations in which CAB could be used were a superset
of the situations in which CA and CB can currently be used.
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Fuller’s method could be refined along several dimensions. First, in Fuller
(2013) this method is applied to all calls, which seems excessively strong: when
two calls are produced by entirely different articulatory means, it seems unlikely
that they evolved by fission of an ancestral call. For instance, in Blue monkeys and
Putty-nosed monkeys, booms are produced with air sacs whereas other calls (e. g.
pyows and hacks or kas) aren’t, and it does not seem very plausible that all these
calls evolved from one ancestral one. But nothing in Fuller’s logic prevents one
from refining the analysis and applying his algorithms to calls that are produced
by comparable means – which would set booms aside from all other calls.
Second, several additional operations could be added to Fission in order to
explain how repertoires evolve. Logically, a repertoire R (seen as a list of calls)
could evolve by any of the following operations:
(i) disappearance of a call from R;
(ii) de novo emergence of a call that has no part in common with any of the
calls of R;
(iii) modification of a call of R, for instance by (a) removing a part of it (hence
a shortening); (b) adding a new part to it (hence a lengthening);
(c) neither (a) nor (b) (e. g. changing duration, lowering or raising fre-
quency components, etc.)
(iv) combination of several calls of R into a new call;
(v) any combination of (i) through (iv).
Fuller focuses on Fission, but if his method is on the right track the other
conceivable processes listed could be explored as well.
7.2 Putty-nosed vs Blue monkey comparison
Blue monkeys and Putty-nosed monkeys share a common ancestor approximately
2.5 million years ago (Guschanski et al. 2013). The vocal repertoires of these
species, and particularly those of adult males, are strikingly similar, with both
using apparently homologous booms, pyows, and hacks (called kas in Blue
monkeys). This fact could be informative about call evolution, and it might also
be important to understanding pyow-hack sequences: the key question is whether
Blue monkeys have a counterpart of these sequences, and to explain why.
7.2.1 Male Blue monkey calls
Fuller (2013, 2014) evaluated acoustic and functional characteristics of the com-
plete vocal repertoire of adult male Blue monkeys (Cercopithecus mitis stuhlmanni).
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To diagnose call types, this study applied ordination29 and cluster analyses to
acoustic measurements of hundreds of recordings from 20 different males. Results
indicate a repertoire that comprises six distinct call types: boom, pyow, ka, katrain
(a rapid string of kas), ant, and nasal scream, as seen in (81).
(81) Repertoire of male Blue monkeys clustered according to acoustic
similarity (from Fuller 2014)
Distinct call types include: boom, nasal scream, pyow, ant, ka, katrain.
Note that, acoustically, booms are extremely distinct from the cluster of
other call types, within which the nasal scream is separate from the other
four calls.
Fuller’s clustering-based method has two advantages. First, it establishes a
clear, objective method for identifying distinct categories (i. e. call types) within
the system. Second, the results of hierarchical cluster analysis identify natural
29 Ordination is a statistical method that uses variation in multiple variables to arrange objects
in such a way that more similar objects are nearer each other and more dissimilar objects are
further apart.
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grouping patterns among call types that can serve as a starting point in evaluat-
ing the evolutionary history of the calls.
Fuller further studied the distribution of these calls in naturalistic contexts
and in field experiments. The graphs in (82) display the observed frequency of
calls in various contexts, compared to the expected frequency if distribution
were random.
(82) Use of different call types by male Blue monkey calls (adapted from
Fuller 2013 p. 171)
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– As in Campbell’s monkeys, booms are strongly associated with undisturbed
and affiliative contexts, not predators.30
– Kas and katrains typically occur together in the same call sequence and
have similar distributions; we will treat them as a single call arranged in
different ways (thus the syntax will have to ensure that ka can come singly
or in trains). It is clear that kas primarily occur in situations of aerial threats;
other contexts include sudden, loud disturbances such as falling trees. This
is compatible with a version of the specification for non-ground threats that
we posited for Putty-nosed hacks (for hacks, however, we had postulated the
more specific meaning of serious non-ground movement-related threat).
– Pyows are used in all contexts and occur more than expected by chance
with all but falling branches, aerial predators, and undisturbed. Their dis-
tribution is compatible with that of a general alert call, although one would
need to explain why they are less common in contexts of aerial threats.
Competition with kas is a natural explanation.
– Ants might initially seem to be terrestrial predator calls – and this is indeed
how Fuller describes their evolutionary function (Fuller 2013). But their
occurrence in situations of Tree fall disturbances suggests that their use
might reflect a more general reaction of fear. Making full use of the
Informativity Principle, we will posit that ants are general calls, but that
unlike pyows they are used only in situations of relatively serious alert. If we
simultaneously postulate that kas are specified as being used for serious
non-ground alerts, we will plausibly derive the result that kas are more
informative than ants, and hence the Informativity Principle will explain
why we do not find ants in contexts involving aerial predators.31
– Finally, the nasal scream is clearly an agonistic/distress call, used only in
extreme fights between males and then usually by the loser (Fuller 2013).32
We tentatively posit the lexical entries in (83), which must be complemented
by the Informativity Principle in (12). At this preliminary stage, we will make the
assumption that individual calls are complete utterances, and that all non-boom
calls are alternatives to each other, as stated in (84). We treat pyow as a general
30 For example, Fuller (2013) notes that booms are typically associated with males approaching
or being approached by females, suggesting they function to facilitate affiliative interactions.
31 We write ‘plausibly’ because the precise assumption we need is that if there is a serious
aerial-related alert, then there is a serious alert. This follows if aerial alerts are on average at
least as serious as alerts in general – which is probably the case.
32 “Nasal screams were rare, observed only 11 times during this study (<1% of all vocal
episodes). Usage was unambiguously associated with intense aggression between males.”
(Fuller 2013: 74–75).
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alert call, ant as a serious alert call, and we borrow the entry for ka in (83)b1
from our analysis of Putty-nosed hacks (we have provided an alternative version
as (83)b2, inspired by our arousal-based treatment of hack in Section 4.4).
Informativity relations among calls are summarized in (85). We continue to
use an alarm parameter to ensure that repetitions have some semantic effect,
although this will not play a role in our discussion.
(83) Blue monkey semantics
For any alarm parameter a ≥0,
a. 〚pyow〛a = 1 iff there is an alert and the alarm level is at least a.
b1. Version 1: 〚ka〛a = 1 iff there is a serious non-ground movement-
related alert and the alarm level is at least a.
b2. [Version 2: 〚ka〛a = 1 iff there is an alert causing high arousal and
the alarm level is at least a.]
c. 〚ant〛a = 1 iff there is a serious alert and the alarm level is at least a.
d. 〚nasal-scream〛a = 1 iff there is distress in a situation of male-to-male
aggression and the alarm level is at least a.
e. If w is any call and S is any sequence, 〚wS〛a = 1 iff 〚w〛a = 1 and
〚S〛a+1 = 1.
(84) Blue monkey alternatives
Individual calls are complete utterances, and all non-boom calls are alter-
natives to each other
(85) Informativity relations among non-boom Blue monkey sentences
according to (83) (higher = strictly more informative). Note that we assume
that if there is a serious non-ground movement-related alert, then there is a
serious alert – which is why ka appears above ant.
In (86), we provide three possible theories of the meanings of pyow and ant
(where Theory I corresponds to the one sketched above). It is worth noting that if
the Informativity Principle were absolute, the three options in (86) would make
equivalent predictions.
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(86) Three theories of pyow and ant (informally stated, i.e. without alarm level)
a. Theory I (as in (83), (85), with ant more informative)
pyow = (any kind of) alert; ant= serious alert.
b. Theory II (with pyow more informative)
pyow =non-serious alert; ant= (any kind of) alert.
c. Theory III (with neither pyow nor ant more informative than the other)
pyow=non-serious alert; ant= serious alert.
In Theories I and II, the logic of competition ensures that the weaker call gets
enriched by applying the Informativity Principle, hence the strengthened mean-
ings in (87). In Theory III, neither call entails the other, and thus the strength-
ened meanings are identical to the literal meanings in (86)c; but these are
already equivalent to the meanings in (87).
(87) Strengthened meanings of pyow and ant on all three theories in (86)
pyow=non-serious alert, ant= serious alert
Importantly, however, we needn’t assume that the Informativity Principle
applies systematically. In fact, in our pragmatic analysis of Campbell’s monkey
calls, we posited that in the Tai forest the call krak has a literal meaning of general
alert but a strengthened meaning of ‘serious ground threat’; and we took strength-
ening to apply in most but not in all cases, as there seemed to be residual ‘general
alert’ uses of krak in that site. Something similar seems to hold of Blue monkey
pyows in (82): this call occurs in all contexts, unlike ant, which is absent from
Undisturbed and Branch contexts. This gives an advantage to the main analysis
we develop in the text, namely Theory I in (86)a: because pyow is lexically
specified as a general call, we expect it to occur in all contexts when its meaning
is not strengthened. Theories II and III would have to explain why pyow can arise
in serious threat contexts – though this could be done if it turned out that in such
cases pyow appears late in sequences, when the seriousness of the alarm could
have decayed. Theory III has the additional drawback that it must explain why the
general alert call ant fails to occur in Branch and Undisturbed situations. We
tentatively conclude that the analysis we develop in the text is preferable.
We leave for future research a discussion of the role of the nasal scream in
the system, and in particular of its effect on competition relations when the
Informativity Principle is taken into account. If the nasal scream enters in these
relations, its effect will be limited anyway: since its use is so specific, no other
call will be strictly more informative. And for the same reason, the enrichment it
will give rise to will be very weak; specifically, with the informativity relations
obtained in (85), its sole effect will be to enrich pyow with an inference that one
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is not in a situation of male-to-male aggression with distress. By contrast, the
left-hand side of the informativity hierarchy in (85) will be strongly affected by
the Informativity Principle. We already saw that pyow and ant should have a
strengthened meaning that blocks their use in situations of serious aerial alert.
In addition, pyow will be enriched with a not ant component, which predicts that
it should not generally be used in cases of serious alert.
7.2.2 Comparison with Putty-nosed monkeys
Several interesting questions are raised by the comparison between Blue mon-
key and Putty-nosed monkey calls: (i) how similar are their repertoires and what
does this tell us about their evolutionary history? (ii) how similar is their syntax?
7.2.2.1 Repertoire comparison and evolution
Let us first point out the acoustic and semantic similarities between the two
repertoires.
Acoustic structure: the call types used by male Blue monkeys are remarkably
similar to those used by male Putty-nosed monkeys, as seen in (88). Booms and
pyows, for example, are acoustically matched between species, and the Blue
monkey ka and katrain are clearly counterparts to the Putty-nosed hack, which is
used singly or in a rapidly repeated string.
(88) Spectographs of Blue monkey calls (top line) vs. Putty-nosed monkey
calls (bottom line).
Representative spectrographs (produced in Raven 1.4, by JF) for each call
type in the vocal repertoire of adult male Blue monkeys (Cercopithecus
mitis) and adult male Putty-nosed monkeys (Cercopithecus nictitans),
showing considerable similarity between the two species. Samples are
from field recordings (by JF and KA) in wild populations. Names for call
types are from published accounts (Fuller 2014; Arnold et al. 2006a).
72 Philippe Schlenker et al.
 - 10.1515/tl-2016-0001
Downloaded from PubFactory at 08/03/2016 05:33:58PM
via University of St Andrews Scotland
Although published reports of male Putty-nosed calls do not name a counterpart
to Blue monkey ants, Arnold and Zuberbühler (2006b) describe Putty-nosed pyows
as having easily distinguishable long and short variants. The “short pyows” of
Putty-nosed monkeys are extremely similar to Blue monkey ants, suggesting a
homology possibly overlooked due to differences in categorization methods. If so,
only the Blue monkey nasal scream is left without an obvious counterpart in the
Putty-nosed repertoire. This may be an actual difference between the two reper-
toires; however, given the extreme rarity of the Blue monkey nasal scream (see
above), the call might simply have been missed in Putty-nosed monkeys.
Semantics: Despite differences in field methods and data coding among
researchers, there are several obvious similarities in how Blue monkeys and
Putty-nosed monkeys use their calls. The clear association with aerial predators
of the Blue monkey ka/katrain is observed in the acoustically similar Putty-nosed
hack. In both species, pyows are used across a wide variety of contexts.
Importantly, the Informativity Principle might make it possible to posit a rela-
tively stable semantics across Blue monkey and Putty-nosed pyows despite the
fact that in Blue monkeys they are not used at much more than chance in ground
predator situations; if this turns out to be a difference with Putty-nosed pyows,
this could be entirely due to the competition with ants rather than to an intrinsic
difference in the lexical semantics of pyows across the two species.
Should we conclude that calls that “match” between species are homolo-
gous traits, i. e. are inherited by common descent? This is a plausible hypothesis
in view of the close genetic relatedness of these two species, but more work is
needed – in particular to compare these repertoires to those of related cerco-
pithecines. In addition, the results of cross-species comparison should in prin-
ciple converge with Fuller’s method of internal reconstruction, as Fuller’s
method should make it possible to determine which calls resulted from the
Fission of earlier calls. But it is too early to report any real results, and thus
the application of these methods is left for future research.
7.2.2.2 Syntax
Two questions about the syntax would be of great interest.
– First, in diagnosing the repertoire of male Blue monkeys, Fuller 2013 dis-
tinguishes between kas and katrains. Are the latter just sequences of the
former, possibly with induced acoustic differences? And if so, should a
similar distinction be drawn among Putty-nosed hack sequences?
– Second, and most importantly, do we find Blue monkey counterparts of
Putty-nosed pyow-hack sequences? Murphy et al. 2013 cautiously answered
in the negative, though the data were from 20 vocal episodes only. Fuller’s
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data from natural observations and field experiments indicate that there are
instances of pyows followed by kas or katrains, though such sequences were
quite rare.33 But the crucial question is whether these are correlated with
group movement as pyow-hack sequences are in Putty-nosed monkeys. It
would thus be particularly interesting to assess the correlation between
group movement and the appearance of putative pyow-ka sequences,
if possible using the same methods and criteria as in Arnold and
Zuberbühler’s Putty-nosed studies.34
7.3 Calls for the ages: the example of boom
Having seen the potential interest of ‘local’ comparisons among closely related
monkey species, we turn to a case in which it might be possible to reconstruct
the ‘deep history’ of a call, boom, which is found across cercopithecines.
7.3.1 Form and function
Three spectograms of booms are given in (89)a-b, from the species Cercopithecus
pogonias, wolfi ((89)a) and neglectus (= de Brazza monkey) ((89)b). As Gautier-
Hion et al. (1999) emphasize, the production of booms in de Brazza monkeys is
accompanied with a specific postural behavior, as well as tree shaking; postural
changes are also represented in (89)b.
33 Of 10,321 observed vocal episodes, ~1% were pyows followed by kas or katrains; looking at
call combinations only (i. e. episodes in which a male produced more than one call type),
however, the pyow-katrain sequences constitute ~10% of combinations.
34 Two remarks should be added.
(i) Since ants could also be the counterparts of some subspecies of pyows, one could in
principle study the effect of ant-ka sequences as well.
(ii) Different theories of Putty-nosed pyow-hack sequences don’t make quite the same pre-
dictions about other species. For non-compositional theories, there could be another
species with the very same call system and environment as Putty-nosed monkeys but
without pyow-hack sequences, since the semantic properties of these are not derived from
anything else in the system (on this theory, one could still ask where in a phylogenetic
tree pyow-hack sequences arose, essentially treating those as a complex call). For
compositional/pragmatic theories, by contrast, the use of pyow-hack sequences follows
from other properties of the semantics/pragmatics of the system, and thus if Blue
monkeys have the same calls as Putty-nosed monkeys but lack pyow-ka sequences,
one would expect that the semantics or pragmatics of these calls is in fact slightly
different from that of their Putty-nosed counterparts.
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(89) Production of boom
Superficial inspection reveals that across species booms are highly distinct com-
pared to other calls, since (i) their production requires highly developed air sacs;
(ii) they often come in pairs, in triples or in quadruples, whereas most other calls
come in sequences of varying lengths; (iii) they are produced at a very low pitch
(120–140 Hz) and have low attenuation rates, as emphasized by Waser and Waser
(1977) (one of their functionsmight relate to intergroup spacing). Finally, (iv) across
cercopithecines, they are used in situations that do not involve predation. This can
be seen rather clearly in the data used by Ouattara et al. (2009a, 2009b) in (19):
booms entirely fail to occur in Eagle and in Leopard contexts; by contrast, they are
found in situations of Intergroup encounters, Tree fall, and Coherence and travel.
The same trend is seen in (82) for Blue monkeys booms: they are almost absent
from situations involving aerial predators, and uncommon in situations involving
terrestrial predators. By contrast, they are particularly common in undisturbed
situations and in ones involving falling branches. Specific functions that have
been suggested in the literature include group cohesion; intergroup spacing; and
mate attraction (see for instance Fuller 2013 and Gautier-Hion et al. 1999).
7.3.2 Distribution in cercopithecines and evolution
Can the current distribution of booms in cercopithecines tell us something about
the evolutionary history of these calls? Based on sources collated by Gautier, we
have highlighted on the phylogenetic trees from Guschanski et al. (2013) those
Spectrographic analyses of loud call sequences of three Cercopithecini species beginning by
booms (from Gautier-Hion et al. 1999). (a) Pairs of booms of Cercopithecus pogonias (top) and
Cercopithecus wolfi (bottom). (b) In this graph, a male Cercopithecus neglectus (= de Brazza
monkey) is represented as sitting on a branch while producing pair of booms, separated by a
third one, which corresponds to the filling of the air sacs.
Formal monkey linguistics 75
 - 10.1515/tl-2016-0001
Downloaded from PubFactory at 08/03/2016 05:33:58PM
via University of St Andrews Scotland
cercopithecines which are currently believed to have booms. The result, in (90),
suggests two polar hypotheses. One is that booms were present in the common
ancestors of Cercopithecus hamlyni, pogonias, mitis and nictitans, which lived
approximately 7 million years ago – and if so they might have been lost in other
species of cercopithecines (or might have been missed in extant descriptions of
repertoires); or booms didn’t exist in these ancestors, and evolved independently
at least three times in cercopithecines.
(90) The distribution of boom and of air sacs
Phylogenetic tree of cercopithecines (from Guschanski et al. 2013), with boldfaced names for
species that have booms, # for species that have air sacs (all species with booms have air sacs,
but some species that have air sacs don’t have booms), and ? if it is unknown whether the species
has air sacs. If nothing is indicated, the species has no booms, and only undeveloped air sacs.
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It is of course possible to have intermediate theories. For instance, there may
have been two separate evolutions of booms, one in an ancestor of Cercopithecus
Hamlyni, and one in a common ancestor of the Mona group and of the Nictitans
group (Mitis/Albogularis-Subgroups). On this view, one would need to explain
how in several subfamilies that are also descended from this ancestor booms
disappeared.
On the other hand, it does seem likely that the common ancestor of the mitis
group, which according to this phylogeny lived approximately 2.5 million years
ago, had booms: since all extant mitis subgroups have booms, it is parsimonious
to posit that their common ancestor had it as well, and that it wasn’t lost.
Similarly for the group that includes Pogonias, Mona, Campbell and Neglectus:
it would seem parsimonious to posit that their common ancestor had booms,
more than 5 million years ago.35 We take it to be an extraordinary fact about
monkey languages that part of their history can apparently be reconstructed
over millions of years.
Still, the study of booms should not be based solely on information that
pertains to cercopithecines. One key prerequisite for booms is the existence of air
sacs. This can be determined biologically and distributionally, as in (90): all
species with booms have air sacs, but some species with air sacs (e. g.
Cercopithecus preussi) don’t have booms. In order to assess different theories
of the evolution of booms, one would need to determine (i) how likely it is for air
sacs to appear or disappear in a certain time period, and (ii) how likely booms
are to emerge on the assumption that air sacs are present, a relevant question
since Fitch (2006) notes that air sacs appear to have evolved independently in
several animal lineages. In the case of great apes, all have air sacs, but these are
only embryonic in humans – which leads Fitch (2006) to posit that they existed
in the ancestors of all apes and were lost in humans. Addressing a similar
question for air sacs in cercopithecines might be the first step towards an
understanding of the evolution of booms.
35 At this point, it would be essential to combine the information we have about calls with the
genetic information available in order to assess the probability of various scenarios. After all,
the distribution of booms is a relevant fact when we seek to reconstruct the evolutionary history
of cercopithecines; for instance, in case two phylogenies A and B are equally likely on the basis
of genetic data, but A makes for a much more parsimonious analysis of the evolutionary history
of booms, then A should presumably be preferred over B. Thus one should seek to develop a
combined analysis of possible phylogenies based both on genetic information and on the
distribution of booms.
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7.3.3 Comparative syntax of booms
We expect that future research will explore the comparative syntax of booms
across cercopithecines. In Campbell’s monkeys, nearly all the booms we have in
our data appear as a single pair at the beginning of sequences. But interestingly
the situation is different in Mona monkeys, which are part of a sister group to
Campbell’s monkeys (although in the phylogeny of Guschanski et al. (2013) their
most recent common ancestor lived more than 5 million years ago). In data
collected by Glenn (1996), booms given alone usually appear as a single pair; but
booms that precede what she calls ‘low hack series’ usually come in pairs of
pairs, and sometimes also in triple and quadruple pairs. An exploration of the
data and of possible analyses would be of great interest.
8 Conclusions
8.1 Methodology
On a methodological level, the development of a ‘formal primate linguistics’
should help sharpen existing analyses and precipitate the emergence of new
ones. At this very early stage, it seems wise to pit several theories against each
other and to assess the advantages and drawbacks of each, rather than to jump
to grand conclusions on the basis of shaky generalizations. We take the first
order of business to be to establish a clear methodology, one in which formal
models make it possible to derive crucial predictions, which can then be tested
on the basis of experimental and observational data. While the present paper
pertains to monkey calls, it should be clear that the same methodology can be
applied to other systems of animal communication; our explorations can thus be
seen as a contribution to ‘primate linguistics’, and possibly to a broader field of
‘animal linguistics’ (see for instance Yip 2006; Berwick et al. 2011).
8.2 Linguistic modules
On a substantive level, our syntactic generalizations were modest and could be
handled with very simple finite state grammars. It would be interesting to
explore in future research (i) whether all monkey languages can indeed be
described in such simple terms, especially when larger databases are consid-
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ered, and (ii) if so, which subset of finite state grammars best characterizes the
syntax of these languages (see for instance Pullum and Rogers 2006 and Rogers
and Pullum 2011).
Our semantics mostly relied on simple propositional meanings, although
we did posit a non-trivial semantics for the Campbell’s suffix -oo. While
it would have been tempting to posit predicative meanings rather than pro-
positional ones for some complex calls, we believe that this should only be
done in the face of strong evidence: predicative types are more expressive and
thus less constrained than propositional ones, hence theories might lose in
explanatory force if predicative meanings are multiplied without strict neces-
sity. The device of an alarm parameter added a bit of complexity to our
analyses, but it had the benefit of offering a semantic distinction among
sentences that only differed in the number of repetitions of some calls. Still,
the same result could be achieved within a more modular analysis in which
the calling rate has a semantic/pragmatic effect per se, independently from
the semantic contribution of sentences; we leave this possibility for future
research.
Our pragmatics was largely based on implicature-like rules of informativity-
based competition among calls or sequences, although we did explore in our
analysis of Putty-nosed semantics the possibility of using competition based on
Urgency.
A constant theme hovered over our investigations: in each case, we had
to ask in detail what was the division of labor between syntax, semantics,
pragmatics, and properties of the environmental context. We gave rather different
answers in different analyses; for instance, our lexicalist theory of Campbell’s
calls had little place for pragmatics, whereas in our pragmatic alternative, rules
of competition among calls played a crucial role. And when we turned to Titi
calls, properties of the environmental context turned out to be crucial
to understand their complex distribution. We believe that the division of
labor among linguistic modules, which has played an important role in
recent human linguistics, will turn out to be crucial in monkey linguistics
as well.
Finally, phonetics and phonology were largely absent from our investiga-
tions, but this is primarily an effect of the particular areas of interest and
competence of the authors. It is clear that a more detailed understanding of
monkey phonetics and phonology will prove essential to all aspects of our
enterprise – in particular to the analysis of monkey morphology, but also to
the ‘evolutionary monkey linguistics’ we sketched at the end of this paper.
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8.3 Theory of truth
Within our semantic investigations, we developed a very standard theory of
truth, and thus accounted for generalizations of the form: If sentence S is uttered
in situation c, then S is true if and only if ____ holds in c. On the assumption that
sentences are only uttered if they are (thought to be) true, we make predictions
of the form: If sentence S is uttered in situation c, then ___ holds in c. Importantly,
such a theory does not seek to predict which sentences are uttered in a given
situation; this would require the converse conditional, of the form: If ___ holds in
situation c, then sentence S is uttered in c. This is also not something that
semantic theories for human languages seek to deliver; whether it is a reason-
able goal for monkey languages could be explored in the future.
We also remained quite conservative in assuming that the same theory of
truth applies to the speaker and to the hearers. In human languages, this is a
reasonable assumption since the same individuals can be speakers and hearers.
But for monkey languages this need not be the case: females do not usually
produce the same alert calls as males, and thus it is conceivable that their
comprehension of meaning is not quite the same as that of the males. Here
too, it is too early to tell whether it would be fruitful to explore different theories
of truth for speakers and hearers.
More radically, one might also ask in the future whether a theory of monkey
truth is the right way to go. We argued that, at a minimum, monkeys must know
under what conditions a call is or isn’t applicable – and the bipartition between
‘applicable’ and ‘inapplicable’ is just the distinction between ‘true’ and ‘false’
under a different name. Still, our analyses remained linguistic in that they
provided an analysis of calls that does not obviously extend to other informa-
tion-bearing phenomena in nature. One could explore a more minimal analysis
in the future. In a nutshell, the motivation for a less linguistic analysis could go
like this:
– There is widespread inter-species comprehension among forest species – as
noted, Diana monkeys react appropriately to Campbell’s calls and conver-
sely (e. g. Zuberbühler 2002). It is likely that general cognitive abilities are
responsible for this capacity: just like an eagle shriek is indicative of eagle
presence, any eagle-related call from species X heard by species Y is under-
stood by Y to be indicative of eagles.
– But this might suggest that there is nothing specific about the comprehension
of the alert calls of species X by members of species X. This is of course an
empirical question; one key element is whether members of species X under-
stand the calls of species X in a more fine-grained fashion than the members
of species Y do (especially if species Y is only distantly related to species X).
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If no difference is found, this might suggest that there is nothing specifically
linguistic about a theory of call comprehension.
– This might still leave open the possibility that the conditions under which
calls are produced are quite specific, and possibly not related to general
reasoning abilities. If so, we might posit a kind of speaker-bound theory of
truth as we have done in this paper, with no corresponding hearer theory of
truth. If not, it might be that both the speaker and hearer sides need to be
analyzed using general reasoning abilities.
Of course it remains to be seen how such a semantics based on general reason-
ing alone could deal with the data we have adduced; but this would be an
interesting problem for future research.
8.4 Evolution
We were cautious not to claim that monkey languages share non-trivial proper-
ties with human language. What counts as ‘non-trivial’ lies in the eye of the
beholder, and one could take the possible existence of complex calls and of
suffixes, or the existence of implicatures, to be such ‘non-trivial properties’.
Arguably, however, these are extremely natural properties for any linguistic
system which (i) is severely limited by the size of the vocabulary, as is likely the
case for monkey languages, and which (ii) conveys information that has greater
utility when it is more specific. While we hope, like everybody else, that studies
of monkey languages will eventually provide insights into the biological evolu-
tion of human language, we think that this will first require a good under-
standing of the systems to be compared – hence the importance of the
development of a formal monkey linguistics. On the other hand, we are con-
vinced that it is now possible to approach the simpler question of the ‘local’
evolution of monkey languages: there are enough diverse species with partly
shared call systems that one can hope to gain real insights into their evolu-
tionary history. The development of an ‘evolutionary monkey linguistics’ would
thus seem to us to be a topic of great interest, and it should offer a fertile testing
ground for theories of language evolution, in particular for game-theoretic
analyses of the evolution of meaning (e. g. Skyrms 2010 and Franke and
Wagner 2014).
If one is interested in the evolution of human language, one should apply
the present methods to the development of an ape linguistics, which should
serve as a particularly useful point of comparison for human linguistics;
and since apes have not just vocalizations but also rich gestural inventories
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(e. g. Genty et al. 2009, Hobaiter and Byrne 2011), both modalities should be
relevant for this further project.
8.5 Linguistics
Finally, we hope to have shown that non-human primate communication sys-
tems can be illuminated with methods from formal linguistics. Even if the
properties of these systems are quite distinct from those of human language,
linguists can bring to the table their understanding of general issues of mod-
ularity as well as particular techniques they have developed to deal with them.
Primate data could also allow linguists to ask in an empirically satisfying
fashion questions that are currently rather speculative in human language,
pertaining to the typology of linguistic systems within related species, and to
their evolutionary history. In the short term, we call the field to follow the lead
of several linguistics journals in displaying openness to primate work that uses
linguistics methods.36 In the long term, we hope that primate linguistics will
become a sub-area of linguistics simpliciter, just as primate cognition is now a
sub-area of cognitive psychology.
Supplementary materials: Colobus data
We include below Guereza Colobus data from Kaniyo Pabidi (as in (49)) and
from Sonso, as well as King Colobus data. Conventions are the same as in (49).
Thus in each case, each box represents the response to one variant of a specific
stimulus, as described at the top of the columns. The first line in the column
header represents the predator type (e. g., Eagle, Leopard) and the second line
the way it was induced, e. g., through a playback of its “shrieks” or “growls”, or
through the playback of calls from Diana monkeys or Black and White Colobus
(bwC) as produced in response to such a predator’s acoustic manifestation. For
conciseness and legibility, no more than 10 groups (or sentences) of calls are
represented, and no more than 15 calls within each of these groups/sentences
are represented.
36 So far, Linguistics & Philosophy, Lingua, Natural Language & Linguistic Theory, and
Theoretical Linguistics have published (or accepted for publication) articles devoted to primate
linguistics.
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(91) Guereza Colobus data from Kaniyo Pabidi
eagle
shrieks
eagle
bwC
leopard
growls
leopard
bwC
leopard
fur
lion
growls
chimp
bwC
chimp
fur
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Calls
r
s
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(92) Guereza Colobus data from Sonso
eagle
shrieks
eagle
bwC
eagle
real
leopard
growls
leopard
bwC
leopard
bwC
[no s]
leopard
fur
cat
real
chimp
calls
chimp
fur
human
real
cow
fur
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Calls
r
s
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(93) King Colobus data
eagle
shrieks
eagle
Diana
leopard
growls
leopard
Diana
leopard
Campbell
leopard
Polykomos
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Calls
r
s
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